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Summary 
Afghanistan is one of the world’s poorest countries, found just above Niger in the bottom of 
the United Nations’ Human Development Index of 2009. The country has been left shattered 
after decades of conflict, drained for resources and with most of their infrastructure destroyed. 
After the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1988, Afghanistan was no longer the centre attention 
for the actors of the cold war. The suffering of Afghan people during the following years of 
civil war was mostly ignored by the rest of the world. This came to a sudden end when Al 
Qaida took the blame for the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in USA on 
September 11th 2001. As Al Qaida was supported by the Islamic organization Taliban and so 
found sanctuary in Afghanistan, the country was once again in the world’s spotlight.  
From being a small scale producer of opium, the Afghan drug industry has grown 
dramatically during the last three decades. According to United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) the Afghan production now accounts for 79 % of all illicit opium in the 
world. The money from the industry helps finance conflicting groups in the country, such as 
the Taliban. The vast amounts of valuables tied to the industry further fuels conflicts as the 
stakes get higher. At the same time opium poppy is a crop highly adaptable to difficult 
conditions and has been the safe crop for farmers living in insecure areas.  
UNODC is the leading organization on research and illicit crop monitoring in Afghanistan. 
They have been following the development in the Afghan opium industry and have issued 
yearly reports on the situation since 1994. According to the organization the opium poppy 
cultivation in Afghanistan covered 104 000 hectares of arable land in 2005. This was enough 
to produce 4 100 metric tonnes of raw opium, or 87 % of the world’s illicit opium.  
The security situation in the country and the fact that most governmental institutions have 
been non-functioning for decades is however making the availability of statistical material 
limited. To my knowledge no other sources than UNODC have attempted to measure the 
Afghan opium production in 2005 and all research on the area hinges on the data provided by 
this organization.  
The first goal of this thesis was to summarize the theoretical expositions on the growth of the 
industry and to provide another estimate of the cultivation of opium poppy in 2005, based on 
micro data from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) from 2005. The 
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thesis also looks closer at provincial differences, the total number of people involved in the 
industry and reported opium eradication episodes. 
When comparing the results from the NRVA data to the reports of UNODC it is evident that 
the patterns of the Afghan opium industry are very different in the two expositions. The size 
of opium poppy cultivation in 2005 is smaller by NRVA estimation than what is claimed by 
UNODC, but more striking is the difference in number of households involved in the opium 
production. While UNODC estimates that about 309 000 families was cultivating opium 
poppy in Afghanistan in 2005, the same number was no more than 90 000 by the NRVA data. 
At the same time, on average each of these households cultivates larger amounts of poppy 
than what UNODC claims. 
The second part of the thesis is dedicated to the investigation of poppy farmers’ 
characteristics and their incentives for choice of crop. Theory on the subject is mainly written 
by one man, David Mansfield. Mansfield is seen as the leading researcher on livelihoods of 
Afghan poppy farmers and is widely used as an expert source by both the UN and the World 
Bank. In his research the poppy farmers’ limited access to alternative livelihoods has a central 
part in explaining their choice of opium poppy cultivation. The thesis makes an overview of 
the theoretical work on the subject and compares the theory to findings in data from the 
NRVA survey.  
From the information available in the NRVA data it is evident that the average poppy farmer 
is not poorer than the rest of the population. On the contrary these families seem to have 
higher income, lower debt and in general better access to assets than the average rural 
household. The data contradict David Mansfield’s theories on most points. The choice of the 
farmers regarding opium poppy cultivation seems more linked to the security situation than to 
their lack of resources. 
The end of the thesis also includes an investigation of other actors in the Afghan opium 
business, a part of the industry that has been subject to limited prior research. 
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1 Introduction 
Afghanistan is one of the world’s poorest countries, found just above Niger in the bottom of 
the United Nations’ Human Development Index of 2009 (UNDP, 2009). The country has been 
left shattered after decades of conflict, drained for resources and with most of their 
infrastructure destroyed. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1988, Afghanistan was no 
longer the centre attention for the actors of the cold war. The suffering of Afghan people 
during the following years of civil war was mostly ignored by the rest of the world. This came 
to a sudden end when Al Qaida took the blame for the attacks on the World Trade Centre and 
the Pentagon in USA on September 11th 2001. As Al Qaida was supported by the Islamic 
organization Taliban and so found sanctuary in Afghanistan, the country was once again in 
the world’s spotlight. 
From being a small scale producer of opium, the Afghan drug industry has grown 
dramatically during the last three decades. According to United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) (2009) the Afghan production now accounts for 79 % of all illicit opium in 
the world. The money from the industry helps finance conflicting groups in the country, such 
as the Taliban. The vast amounts of valuables tied to the industry further fuels conflicts as the 
stakes get higher. At the same time opium poppy is a crop highly adaptable to difficult 
conditions and has been the safe crop for farmers living in insecure areas.  
UNODC is the leading organization on research and illicit crop monitoring in Afghanistan. 
They have been following the development in the Afghan opium industry and have issued 
yearly reports on the situation since 1994 (UNODC, 2003). According to the organization the 
opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan covered 104 000 hectares of arable land in 2005. This 
was enough to produce 4 100 metric tonnes of raw opium, or 87 % of the world’s illicit opium 
(UNODC, 2005).  
The security situation in the country and the fact that most governmental institutions have 
been non-functioning for decades is however making the availability of statistical material 
limited. To my knowledge no other sources than UNODC have attempted to measure the 
Afghan opium production in 2005 and all research on the area hinges on the data provided by 
this organization.  
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The first goal of this thesis is to summarize the theoretical expositions on the growth of the 
industry and to provide another estimate of the cultivation of opium poppy in 2005, based on 
micro data from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment from 2005. I will also look 
closer at provincial differences, the total number of people involved in the industry and 
reported opium eradication episodes. All estimations are compared to UNODC’s data. 
The second part of the thesis is dedicated to the investigation of poppy farmers’ 
characteristics and their incentives for choice of crop. Theory on the subject is mainly written 
by one man, David Mansfield. Mansfield is seen as the leading researcher on livelihoods of 
Afghan poppy farmers and is widely used as an expert source by both the UN and the World 
Bank. In his research the poppy farmers’ limited access to alternative livelihoods has a central 
part in explaining their choice of opium poppy cultivation. I will make an overview of the 
theoretical work on the subject before this theory is compared to findings in data from the 
NRVA survey. The thesis also includes an investigation of other actors in the Afghan opium 
business, a part of the industry that has been subject to limited prior research. 
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2 Background 
2.1 Opium cultivation 
Opium is a narcotic substance generated from Papaver somniferum, or the opium poppy plant. 
Opium poppy is one of the oldest medical plants used by humans and its properties have been 
known for nearly 8000 years (Husain, 1983). The name opium was first given by the ancient 
Greeks, but the cultivation of opium is thought to have started even earlier, in Mesopotamia, 
an area around the Tigris-Euphrates river system. In modern times the golden triangle; 
Thailand, Burma, Laos and Vietnam, was for long the largest producer of illicit opium, but in 
just a few decades Afghanistan has completely taken over that role, and the country is now 
producing about 80 % of all opium in the world, according to United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC, 2009) 
The opium poppy is an annual crop with a growth cycle of about 120 days. It can be planted 
either during the spring or the autumn, depending on the climate. In Afghanistan the planting 
season in the autumn stretches from September to December, and in the spring from February 
to March, varying by province. Best growing conditions are found in areas with a climate of 
low humidity and limited rainfall, although drought may destroy the crops. Still, opium poppy 
is relatively easily grown. The plant is resistant to limited irrigation, it can grow at high 
altitudes and it does not require any expensive fertilizers (Booth, 1996).  
When the poppy is fully grown and the leaves of the plant start falling of, the farmer waits 10 
to 20 days before he starts harvesting the opium latex. Where the flower petals used to be the 
plant is now left with a capsule, and this is where the opium is harvested from. The operation 
of collecting the opium from the plant is an extremely labor intensive task. The capsule is cut 
by a knife consisting of multiple sharp pointed blades, and the opium latex seeps out. In the 
legal, commercial opium industry this work is usually done by machines, but in a country like 
Afghanistan the work of lacing the opium capsules is done by the farmer and his family or his 
employees. 
The farmer usually lances only part of his poppy field during a day. The next morning the 
opium is collected by scraping the latex from the capsules using a small scoop. This work 
goes on until all the plants have been cut and the latex collected several times. For each time 
the plants are cut, the capsules give out smaller and smaller amounts of opium. To keep the 
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opium from sticking to the scoop, the farmer wets the scoop by dipping it in water or simply 
licking it. This leaves a number of cultivators addicted to the opium they are producing 
(Booth, 1996). After collecting the latex, it is gathered into small containers where it is dried 
for a few days to decrease the level of water in the opium mass. The opium gum is later 
packed together in cakes that can be sold directly or stored, covered up by leaves or plastic. 
Raw opium with high purity has the ability that it can be preserved for a long time without 
loss of quality. 
 
2.2 Wars and invasions 
Researchers have found traces of what might be the world’s earliest farming communities on 
Afghan land, but the modern state of Afghanistan is though to have been founded by the 
Persian warrior Ahmad Khan Abdali in 1747 (Rasanayagam, 2007).  By his many victories on 
the battlefield he managed to build a fortune that later made it possible for him to reward his 
loyal followers and gain the respect and obedience of the Afghan chiefs that might otherwise 
not have accepted him as their leader. Ahmad Khan Abdali, later known as Ahmad Sha 
Durani, is thus the builder of what is considered the beginning of the political state of 
Afghanistan. His position was later inherited by his son, Timur, who had the advantage of his 
father’s prestige creating relatively stable political conditions in the Afghan empire. During 
Timur’s years in power he had 23 sons by his legal wives alone, all with equal claim to the 
throne. This created an environment of rivalry and after the death of Timur Sha the struggle 
for the right to the throne disintegrated the Durani Empire. By this time it was evident that 
Afghanistan was a country without nationalism, build up by a collection of peoples and their 
tribes. 
In the 19th century the British and the Russian Empire where both expanding their territories 
in the Middle East and their struggle over power in the area was has later been termed The 
Great Game (Fromkin, 1980). This European imperialism came to influence Afghanistan a 
great deal. During the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century the rivalry between 
the two powerful empires resulted in three wars on Afghan soil, called the Anglo-Afghan 
wars (Väyrynen, 1980). Although no central government could control the country and its 
many different tribes without foreign support, the Afghan people are known to be resistant to 
predominance, and the country retained most of their sovereignty during the wars.  
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Due to its strategic location and its natural resources Afghanistan has been both wooed and 
invaded by multiple imperialistic powers throughout history. In 1979, Afghanistan was 
invaded by the Soviet army. The Soviet invasion lasted for ten years, but their troops met 
surprisingly hard resistance. Their withdrawal from the country in 1989 was a serious hit to 
the Kremlin reputation. During the invasion the mujahedeen, Afghan freedom fighters, 
fighting the Soviet army by guerrilla warfare was supported with arms and supply by the U.S. 
The two superpowers fought their war indirectly through the war in Afghanistan, leaving the 
country shattered. After the defeat and withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Afghanistan, the 
country remained unstable and a civil war followed. This war had several actors fighting for 
territory by the support of foreign nations. The different tribal chiefs and warlords all had 
their own agenda and most of them had no problems shifting sides and allies in the conflicts 
to reach their goal. It was during this period that the Islamic movement of Taliban first 
entered the scene and later developed to be one of the main actors in the new political 
landscape of Afghanistan. 
 
2.3 The Taliban 
Through the war-filled years of the 1990s, the Sunni Islamic organization of Taliban grew, 
from being a student movement to a military and political organization fighting for the power 
in Afghanistan (Rashid, 2001). The Taliban, mainly consisting of Pashtun men growing up in 
Pakistani refugee camps and in Islamic madrassas, was greeted welcome by the war-weary 
Afghan population. The people were willing to accept the strict Islamic regulations in change 
for Taliban’s promises of peace and the rebuilding of the country without corruption. During 
the war the Taliban was heavily supported by Pakistan, especially by their intelligence service 
ISI. Although it has never been confirmed by the U.S. government, it is widely recognized 
that the U.S. also supported Taliban during the 90s.  
Afghanistan’s strategic placement in the region is probably the reason why so many foreign 
actors took interest in the civil war of the country. The possibilities of a pipeline for natural 
gas through Afghanistan may seem to have made the U.S. government close their eyes to 
Taliban’s violations to human rights. In the late 1990s the Taliban were in control of a large 
part of the country but still only gained diplomatic recognition by a handful of countries. 
Their housing of Arab jihad warriors such as Osama Bin Laden soured their relationship with 
the U.S. after attacks on American embassies in east Africa in 1998. The American president 
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Bill Clinton also struggled to justify their silence towards Taliban’s violation of human rights 
for the American public.  
As the world headed into a new millennium the situation took a new turn for the Taliban. In 
2001 Al Qaida took full responsibility for the attacks on American soil on September 11th, and 
by hiding the world’s most wanted man, the Taliban and Afghanistan again had the full 
attention of the world. The events of september 11th led to yet another foreign invasion in 
Afghanistan, an invasion that still keeps NATO troops, and so Norwegian soldiers, in the 
country. 
 
2.4 Ethnic diversity 
Afghanistan is a country with several ethnic groups. The largest group is the Pashtuns, 
accounting for nearly half of the country’s population. The Pashtuns speaks Pashto and has 
traditionally been the dominant ethnic group of the country. The second largest group is the 
Tadjiks. The Tadjiks speak Dari and have close ties to the country of Tajikistan. Within the 
Afghan borders one will also find Hazaras, Uzbeks, Nuristani, Baluchi and Turksmen among 
others.1
 
 The diversity of peoples, cultures and languages has at times made Afghanistan more 
a collection of tribes than a country, and the attempt to govern the nation from Kabul has been 
proven difficult. Still, the fact that Afghanistan has never been colonized is something that 
binds the country together in national pride. The defeat by superpowers such as the Soviet 
Union in controlling the country has given the Afghanis a strong believe in the ability to resist 
any invasion and this might explain how the Taliban could support Al Qaida and the attach on 
World trade center in 2001. They had absolute faith in their religion but also in Afghanistan’s 
ability to resist an invasion yet again. So far, they have not been proven wrong. 
                                                 
 
 
1 http://www.afghanistans.com/Information/People/EthnicityLanguages.htm 
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3 Explanations for the rise in the Afghan opium 
industry 
The reason for the last decades’ exponential growth in the Afghan opium industry can hardly 
be explained by simple marked mechanisms alone. This chapter puts forward an overview of 
the different theoretical expositions that have been promoted as the explanations for the rise 
of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The different expositions are highly dependent, 
but to get a better understanding of the different mechanisms I will treat them separately 
where this is possible.  
 
3.1 The favorable environment for poppy cultivation in Afghanistan 
Opium poppy has been grown by Afghan farmers throughout history, but never to the extent 
that is seen the last 30 years. In explaining the development of the opium industry of 
Afghanistan one should not fail to mention the favorable environment for the crop in this area. 
One hectare of land dedicated to opium poppy yields 2-3 times more raw opium in 
Afghanistan than in Myanmar, the only other nation competing with Afghanistan on the 
world’s illegal opium marked (Martin, 2006).  
The crop is well adapted to the cold winters of Afghanistan and is resistant to drought. After 
harvest it can be stored for longer periods of time and easily transported over longer distances. 
The central placement of the country in region, and the lack of control of its borders make 
access to the world markets easy. Cultivation of poppy is not particularly land or capital 
intensive but on the other hand it is a highly labor intensive activity. This makes it an ideal 
crop for the mountainous, arid country with limited arable land and non-functioning 
infrastructure but a large population of unskilled workers and low wages.  
 
3.2 The vacuum in the international opium market after the 1990s 
Despite clearly favourable conditions, Afghanistan was for a long period of time a small 
producer of opium compared to the countries of the Golden Triangle; Vietnam, Myanmar, 
Thailand and Laos. The opium yields of Afghanistan are more than four times those in most 
8 
 
other countries in Asia, but still the heroin on the streets of Europe and North America mostly 
originated from the Golden Triangle up until recently (Martin, 2006). From producing one 
third of the world’s opium as late as in 1998, the production of the Golden Triangle has 
decreased to about 5 %. Despite the cut-backs, Myanmar is still the second largest opium 
producer in the world, but the reductions in the Golden Triangle the last decades created 
opportunities for the growth of new markets further west (UNODC, 2008). 
During the 1980’s opium production grew in both Afghanistan and its neighbouring country 
Pakistan. By the beginning of the 1990 Pakistan had become a major producer of illicit opium 
and the industry had roots deep into the Pakistani government. This development was highly 
unpopular with the international community. By strong Western pressure and international aid 
for anti-drugs campaigns the Pakistani government managed to cut the poppy cultivation of 
the country close to zero during the following ten years (Goodhand, 2005). The cut-backs of 
the Asian drugs industry was seen as a great achievement, but as the opium production of 
Pakistan and the Golden Triangle shrunk it created a vacuum on the opium supply marked. 
The prices increased and the market for illicit opium was wide open for new agents. As the 
Pakistani opium industry crossed the border to the north-west to escape the government’s 
crack-down on drugs, Afghanistan, already in chaos from years of conflicts and war, slowly 
evolved into the next major opium producer of the world. 
The world’s demand for illegal opiates is not showing any signs of decline, and while the 
world follows the Afghan struggle against the vast opium industry of the country, chances are 
that if one manages to control the industry in Afghanistan, it will find new, unstable societies 
to grow in. 
 
3.3 Weak law enforcement, high levels of corruption and the lack of a 
functioning state 
This brings me to the next topic; the unstable situation of the country and the lack of a 
functioning state. After decades of conflict, both civil wars and foreign occupations, the 
Afghan state is weak and so is the country’s law enforcement. During years of battle over 
power different parts in the conflicts have encouraged Afghan farmers to grow opium poppy 
in order to finance the warfare (Rashid, 2001). In the years after 2001 the new central 
government, elected after the overthrow of Taliban, has had limited influence in large parts of 
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the country. During this period the Taliban has gained power and their supply of arms is 
mainly financed both through indirect involvement in the drug industry, such as taxation, but 
also direct involvement through trading and smuggling. 
 The severe security problems in parts of the country make law enforcement, such as 
interdiction following an opium ban, difficult to pursue. According to Mansfield (2006) the 
opium ban issued by the government is not seen as credible by a large part of the population. 
At the same time opium offers access to credit in conflict filled and insecure areas where 
commercial financial markets are non-existing. It is a safe crop in areas where irrigation 
systems are destroyed by actions of war, and it is a cash commodity both easily stored and 
traded in an unstable environment with limited infrastructure, where the future is uncertain. 
Mansfield claims that Afghan farmers chose to grow opium because it is “a low risk crop in a 
high risk environment”. 
The lack of a functioning state, the struggle over power and the prevalence of lawlessness in 
Afghanistan seem crucial to the development of the drug industry in the country. The 
evolvement of a shadow economy in the wake of the previous decades of conflicts with deep 
roots into the Afghan society makes the fight against the illegal industry a difficult task. The 
opium industry generates far more income to the Afghan people than the aid economy, and 
these resources further stimulate the economy through increased activities and demand 
(Goodhand, 2005). All though the revenue from the drug industry to a great extent falls in the 
hands of war lords and insurgents, the fact that it contributes to about half of the country’s 
GDP makes the impact of the industry on the Afghan economy enormous (MacDonald, 2007). 
The considerable size of this shadow economy makes it hard to separate the legal from the 
illegal, and the impact of the drug industry is not all negative. But as opium production 
generates livelihoods to the rural population and stimulates the economy in otherwise 
peripheral areas, it also generates a series of economic problems such as inflation, signs of 
Dutch disease and displacement of legal economic activities (Felbab-Brown, 2007). While the 
growth of the Afghan opium industry is partly a consequence of a non-functioning state and 
high levels of corruption, the growing industry further contributes to increasing corruption 
and destabilization of the nation. 
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3.4 Insecurity and conflict level, a two-way causality 
As previously stated the Afghan drugs industry generates vast amounts of resources to 
warlords and insurgents. These drugs-for-arms strategies fuels conflicts as the money from the 
industry helps armed groups to improve their war supply and to pay off their armies. At the 
same time the profitable opium industry increases the struggle over power between different 
groups as there is more money involved and the stakes get higher. Control over areas with 
high levels of poppy cultivation, smuggling routes and boarder crossings get increasingly 
important as the production of the valuable resource grows.  
These effects of the illicit opium industry are well known and subjects of discussions among 
decision makers in and outside of Afghanistan. What is less debated is the reverse causality; 
how conflicts have fueled the opium industry. This theory on the previous decades’ growth in 
the Afghan opium industry is investigated by Lind, Moene and Willumsen (2009). Their 
hypothesis is that violent conflicts simultaneously weakens law and order, and destroys 
infrastructure such as agricultural irrigation systems and roads and that this will lead to 
increased poppy cultivation. In the insecure environment subsequent to armed conflicts the 
farmers will choose the low risk livelihood alternative, in this case poppy cultivation. The 
previously mentioned qualities of opium, the fact that it is relatively drought resistant 
compared to other crops and its properties as a durable good, easily stored and transported 
after harvest, are strong incentives for poppy cultivation for the Afghan farmer living in a 
conflict filled area. 
 As previously stated, the alteration of local governance due to armed conflicts is also named 
as a reason for an increase in the opium production in the paper. Lind, Moene and 
Willumsen’s (2009) article claims that violence and political instability weakens law 
enforcement, making it possible to ignore the law. Prolonged conflict weakens institutions, 
not only by destroying infrastructure but also by the loss of human resources. The role of the 
authorities is taken over by warlords and armed groups, all profiting from increased opium 
production. They can offer protection for the poppy farmers, making the expected punishment 
from doing something illegal go down. At the same time, in an environment of conflict such 
as this, the main goal will be to stay alive and the moral costs and the social stigma of illicit 
activities goes down.  
The researchers claim that as the favorable environment for opium in Afghanistan has always 
been present, the recent rise in the opium industry must be attributed to the latest decades of 
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conflict in the country. They investigate their hypothesis by using Western hostile casualties 
as a proxy of conflict. They find that there is a strong correlation between conflict level and 
opium production. Conflict prior to planting season has a clear impact on poppy cultivation, 
while conflict right after the planting season does not show the same effect. This strengthens 
the idea of conflict-induced opium production. To find the effect of bad institutions on 
conflict-induced opium production, the researchers use distance to the capital, Kabul, as a 
proxy of weak law enforcement. They find that the effect on opium production from hostile 
casualties is greater further away from Kabul, implying that the effect of conflict on opium 
production is lower when law enforcement is good. This confirms the assumption of 
institutional failure as an important factor for conflict-induced opium production. 
The paper concludes that conflicts are one of the main reasons for the rise in the Afghan 
opium production in later years. When conflicts spur opium production and a growing drugs 
industry at the same time fuels conflicts, a society like the Afghan can easily get trapped in a 
vicious circle.  
The mechanisms discussed by Lind, Moene and Willumsen (2009) may be illustrated by a 
two-way causality of conflict and opium production the following way: 
Figure 1 
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A – Low equilibrium 
B – Tipping point/Unstable equilibrium 
C – High equilibrium   
This figure illustrates how the two-way linkage between opium production and conflict might 
explain how some provinces in Afghanistan get trapped in a bad situation, with high levels of 
poppy cultivation and high conflict levels while other provinces remain more stable and 
peaceful without significant opium production.  
The drugs-for-arms mechanism shows how the illicit opium industry finances insurgents and 
rebellions, fueling further conflict. The curve illustrates the fixed relationship between opium 
and conflict in this modeled economy; how much conflict each level of poppy cultivation will 
lead to. The curve would shift upwards if a weapons embargo made it more difficult for the 
actors in the conflict to get access to war supply, or other similar shocks occurred.  
The theory of conflict-induced opium production is the reverse mechanism, showing how 
conflict further stimulates to higher poppy cultivation. High conflict levels destroy 
infrastructure and weaken institutions, making opium poppy a more attractive choice of crop. 
The Conflict-induced Opium Production-curve in figure 1 is the farmers’ response curve. The 
farmers in this economy observe the level of conflict in the economy before choosing how 
much poppy to cultivate.  If the farmers know that the conflict level in the economy lies at 
point c*, the insecurity and unstable environment will leave them to switch from cultivating 
legal crops to more poppy because it is the safest crop in this situation. They will choose to 
cultivate poppy up to the point p*. But these high levels of opium production further fuel the 
instability, resulting in a new, higher level of conflict; c**. This new level again leads the 
farmers to cultivate even more poppy next season; p**. These mechanisms will continue until 
the economy has reached the stable equilibrium C, where both conflict level and levels of 
poppy cultivation are high. If an economy, i.e. an Afghan province, starts of in a point to the 
left of the tipping point B, reverse mechanisms will lead the province to end up in the stable, 
low equilibrium A, with low levels of both opium production and conflict.  
A negative shock like a drought could shift the response curve of the farmers upwards. Poppy 
cultivation will now be higher than prior to the shock for all levels of conflict. If the effect of 
the shock is large enough, the curve could shift up to a point where there is only one 
equilibrium, with high levels of both conflict and poppy cultivation. 
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3.5 Opium and heroin prices 
While the opium production in Afghanistan grew in the beginning of the new millennium, the 
prices of opium fell. From a record high farm-gate price of 301 US$/kg in 2001, the prices 
were down to 102 US$/kg in 2005. These prices are not accurate, but rather estimates, based 
on collected price data in selected provinces by UNODC (2005). The illicit nature of opium 
makes the analysis of prices difficult. According to Byrd and Jonlez (2006), more factors than 
just demand and supply mechanisms must be considered when interpreting the opium price 
trends. Opium’s qualities as a storable good but also the fact that it is an illicit drug that is 
traded at the illegal marked will influence its price. 
The demand for opiates in traditional markets such as the U.S. have been relatively stable but 
there are signs of an increase in demand from countries in close proximity to Afghanistan and 
from countries along the opium/heroin smuggling lines. While the markets surrounding 
Afghanistan mostly demand the raw, unprocessed opium, the European and North American 
users want processed opiates in the form of heroin. In 2004/2005 the number of opiate users 
was estimated to 15,9 million people around the world, but the nature of the drug makes 
demand close to inelastic to price changes and at least in the short run prices are set from the 
supply side (UNODC, 2006b). While the prices of processed opiates to the consumers have 
stayed relatively stable, the purity of the drugs on the streets varies. This could be seen as an 
adjustment strategy to the fluctuating supply.  
Just as the consumers around the world, the cultivators seem to have limited negotiation 
power in terms of prices. They usually act as price takers making them vulnerable to shocks in 
the market.  The enormous surplus between the farm-gate price and the price paid by the 
consumer at the final destination is divided between many links in the opium value chain. The 
small traders, the wholesalers, the refiners, corrupt officials, insurgents and warlords and the 
cross-border smugglers all adds a margin to the price before the drug leaves Afghanistan.  
According to Byrd and Jonglez (2006) there are also large differences in prices across 
different parts of Afghanistan, reflecting the diversity of the market. Proximity to marked 
centers and the borders drives the prices up, but so does the law enforcement and eradication 
efforts. It is a paradox that stronger law enforcement and a larger commitment to eradication 
programs in some provinces will decrease the cultivation of opium and so increase the opium 
prices, making cultivation of the illicit crop more attractive in other provinces. But the 
widespread corruption and insecure conditions in the country has also contributed to a higher 
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price, as the farmers often are required to pay off both criminals and corrupt officials to keep 
their crop safe. Higher prices send a signal to the cultivators to increase their opium 
production, making it profitable to dedicate more of their land to poppy and to invest in 
otherwise too expensive farm-improvements. At the same time a higher opium price can 
increase the value of loans for the salaam indebted families, forcing them to grow larger 
amounts of opium.  
 The farm-gate prices are highly important for the supply of opium in Afghanistan. The 
staggering prices in the first years of the new millennium are at least partial responsible for 
the growth in the industry in the following years, but there are several coexisting factors that 
influence the farmers’ cropping decisions. I will get back to this in chapter 6. 
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4 Critical assessment of UN estimates 
4.1 The UNOCD organization and their estimation methods 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) calls itself “the UN’s center for the 
fight against “uncivil society”” (UNODC, 2008b). Their focus is on the prevention of human 
trafficking, organized crime, drugs and terrorism. Illicit crop monitoring has been one of the 
organization’s most prestigious projects and Afghanistan is on top of their agenda (UNODC, 
2008c). The information from the crop monitoring is used by both the Afghan government 
and other governments to evaluate projects and financial aid.  
The difficulties in gathering reliable information on the subject of opium are acknowledged 
by UNODC, but they still claim they have good overview of the industry in Afghanistan. 
Their assessment of the opium industry in Afghanistan in 2005 is based on satellite imagery in 
addition to field visits. According to the organization the remote sensing approach by use of 
satellite imagery enhanced security and at the same time offered objective estimates of the 
opium poppy cultivation (UNODC, 2005). 
Satellite images were collected from the 15 largest opium producing provinces, images 
covering 16 % of arable land. Randomly selected cells from the collected data were later used 
to estimate the extent of poppy cultivation. Both pre- and post-harvest images was collected 
and later compared to distinguish poppy cultivation from cultivation of other crops. The 
remote sensing was followed by ground surveys in some locations to gather additional 
information. In the remaining provinces that were not analyzed through satellite imagery, 
opium poppy cultivation was estimated solely from ground surveys. According to UNODC 
(2005) only 16 % of the poppy cultivation in 2005 was estimated through ground surveys 
alone.  
 
4.2 UNODC estimates 
UNODC estimated the poppy cultivation to cover 2,3 % of agricultural land, or 104 000 
hectares in 2005. This was a decline from the previous years and was celebrated as a great 
achievement for the new anti-drugs politics implemented after 2001. The celebration later 
silenced when the monitoring of the 2006-season showed massive increases in production. 
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The poppy cultivation of 2005 was thought to generate 4100 mt of opium. According to 
UNODC (2005) the production could have been even lower if it hadn’t been for the favorable 
weather conditions and the low rates of plant disease that year, making the average opium 
yield increase from 32 kg/ha to an impressing 39 kg/ha. Afghanistan was still considered the 
absolute number one country in opium production.  
4.2.1 Provinces 
Only 5 provinces was registered by UNODC with no or insignificant levels of poppy 
cultivation in 2005. The southern region was still by far the largest producer, despite of an 
increase in the production in the north. According to UNODC the five top provinces on opium 
production in was Helmand, Kandahar, Balkh, Farah and Badakhshan. These provinces 
together contributed to almost 2/3 of the opium produced in Afghanistan. Helmand alone was 
contributing to 25 % of the country’s total production. 
Table 1: Opium poppy cultivation in 2005 according to UNODC, by province (hectares) 
Province Poppy 
cultivation in  
2005  ( ha) 
Badakhshan 7 370 
Badghis 2 967 
Baghlan 2 563 
Balkh 10 837 
Bamyan 126 
Farah 10 240 
Faryab 2 665 
Ghazni - 
Ghor 2 689 
Helmand 26 500 
Herat 1 924 
Jawzjan 1 748 
Kabul - 
Kandahar 12 989 
Kapisa 115 
Khost - 
Kunar 1 059 
Kunduz 275 
Laghman 274 
Logar - 
Nangarhar 1 093 
Nimroz 1 690 
Nuristan 1 554 
Paktika - 
Paktya - 
Parwan - 
Samangan 3 874 
Sari Pul 3 227 
Takhar 1 364 
Uruzgan 4 605 
Wardak 106 
Zabul 2 053 
Total 103 907 
 
  
4.2.2 Poppy cultivating farmers 
According to the UNODC (2005) 309 000 families were involved in poppy cultivation, or 
about 2 million people. This means that the organization multiplies the poppy cultivating 
families by the average family size and counts all people living in a poppy cultivating 
Source: UNODC, 2005 
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household as involved in the opium industry. This results is 8,7 % of the Afghan population, a 
huge amount. Their report does not provide any estimate on the number of families or people 
earning income from doing itinerant work on poppy fields.  
The Afghan crop monitoring report of UNODC in 2005 does not include separate numbers of 
poppy farmers by province, but according to their reports the largest number of farmers 
cultivating the illicit crop is found in the northern region. The southern region, with highest 
amount of land dedicated to poppy, has a smaller amount of poppy farmers. 
Table 2: Opium poppy cultivating households in 2005 according to UNODC, by region 
Region Total number 
of poppy 
farming 
households, 
2005 
Average size of 
poppy field per 
poppy cultivating 
household (ha) 
Central - - 
Eastern 22 169 0,18 
North-Eastern 37 241 0,23 
Northern 101 266 0,28 
Southern 89 468 0,52 
Western 58 869 0,28 
Total 309 013 0,34 
 
 
The average land size per household in the rural population was according to UNODC (2005) 
about 2,75 hectares and the land dedicated to poppy cultivation by each poppy cultivating 
family was 0,34 hectares.  
4.2.3 Traders 
Neither UNODC’s annual opium survey for 2005 or the UNODC and World Bank report 
Afghanistan’s Drug Industry (Byrd, 2006) from the following year provide an estimate of the 
number of people working in the Afghan opium industry without being a poppy farmer.  
4.2.4 Eradication 
UNODC was not directly involved in any eradication campaigns and their annual opium 
surveys did not monitor such activities in the period that is being analyzed. However, they 
were asked by the Afghan government to support the verification of eradication activities and 
the numbers provided in the annual opium report are a result of this (UNODC, 2005). 
According to the report about 5 100 hectares of poppy was eradicated in the growing season 
Source: UNODC, 2005 
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ahead of the 2005 opium harvest. This should account for about 5 % of the UNODC-
estimated poppy cultivation. Out of this, 4 007 hectares of eradications was performed by 
governor-led campaigns and was verified by the UNODC. Eradication was both executed by 
the provincial governors and by central authorities. Most eradication was registered in the 
province of Nangarhar (1860 hectares) and Helmand (1046 hectares). According to UNODC 
(2005) the Afghan authorities reported a much higher share of poppy eradication than what 
the organization was able to verify. 
Table 3: Eradication in Afghanistan in 2005 according to UNODC, by province 
(hectares)
Province Poppy 
eradication 
2005, UNODC  
(ha) 
Badakhshan 144 
Badghis - 
Baghlan 63 
Balkh 840 
Bamyan - 
Farah 86 
Faryab - 
Ghazni - 
Ghor - 
Helmand 1046 
Herat 156 
Jawzjan - 
Kabul - 
Kandahar 48 
Kapisa 20 
Khost - 
Kunar 126 
Kunduz - 
Laghman 360 
Logar - 
Nangarhar 1860 
Nimroz - 
Nuristan  - 
Paktika - 
Paktya - 
Parwan - 
Samangan 16 
Sari Pul 112 
Takhar 100 
Uruzgan 126 
Wardak - 
Zabul - 
Total 5 103 
 
 
4.2.5 Poppy cultivation in 2005 compared to 2004 and farmers’ incentives to stop 
opium production 
As mentioned above, the UNODC-estimated opium poppy cultivation fell from 2004 to 2005. 
The number of farmers allegedly leaving opium production was 47 000. The largest cut-backs 
on land dedicated to poppy cultivation were done in Nangarhar, Badakhshan and Uruzgan. 
According to UNODC, the farmers’ main reason for cutting down on or stopping poppy 
cultivation was the fear of eradication. Other reasons were the fear of imprisonment and the 
fact that it is forbidden by their religion. Only about 10 % claims to have cut down or stopped 
production of opium due to lower prices and demand. This should imply that the farmers 
Source: UNODC, 2005 
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choose to stop, or to reduce their poppy cultivation even though they know that it will lead to 
a worsened situation for them, because the consequences of continuing the production could 
be worse.  
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5 The National Risk and Vulnerability 
Assessment (NRVA) 
I have been given access to data from The National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 
(NRVA), first conducted in 2003 by the Central Statistics Office of Afghanistan in 
cooperation with the World Food Program and with the support of the Ministry of Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD-CSO, 2009). The survey covers a broad base of 
development themes such as household’s vulnerability to shocks, food security and women’s 
rights. The data analyzed in this thesis is from the NRVA survey of 2005. At the time it was 
the largest household survey ever conducted in Afghanistan, covering 30 822 respondents and 
was implemented with the support from the European Union (MRRD-CSO, 2007). The 
NRVA survey provides nationwide data on livelihood conditions, not especially targeting 
poppy cultivation or the opium industry. This makes the survey suitable for the evaluation of 
the national opium industry and for comparison to the data provided by the UNODC. 
The lack of credible statistics is a challenge in the war-driven country. To my knowledge 
there has been no alternative assessment of the size of the Afghan opium industry to the work 
of UNODC. The NRVA survey provides a unique opportunity to investigate the industry by 
using micro data as opposed to the UNODC’s data mainly collected from satellite imagery.  
 The respondents in the survey have been informed by the interviewers that the survey will be 
used for government planning and that it may or may not result in special projects or 
programs in the repondents’ community.2
                                                 
 
 
2 National Risk and Vulnerability Survey – Household questionnaire – Final 2005, Appendix 
 The possibility of new development programs and 
increased community aid in the aftermath of the survey could increase the respondents' 
incentives to lie, but the information given to them in connection with the survey should 
minimize this. The illicit nature of opium could also lead respondents to lie about their 
involvement in activities connected to the opium industry. But according to Byrd and 
Buddenberg (2006) there has been a tradition of openness and honesty around the Afghan 
opium industry, stemming from previous times when opium was considered legal. Assuming 
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that the respondents were thoroughly informed about the purpose of the survey, their answers 
should be considered trustworthy. 
 
5.1 The Afghan opium industry in 2005 
The NRVA survey contains several questions on the households’ access to and distribution of 
agricultural land. They are asked how much land they have available, how they manage this 
land and what crops they grow this season. After calculating the given amount of agricultural 
land of the respondents, I have scaled it by a household weight provided in the survey to get 
an estimate of the total amount of agricultural land in Afghanistan. The sizes were given in 
jeribs, a traditional measurement unit in Asia and the Middle East and has been divided by 5 
to be converted into hectares. This yielded a total of about 4 220 000 hectares of cultivated 
land in Afghanistan, which is somewhat smaller than what the UNODC operates with, but 
still seems plausible.  
5.1.1 Poppy cultivation 
The survey does not ask directly how large amount of the respondent’s land that is dedicated 
to different types of crop. The households are asked whether they have access to garden plots, 
irrigated land and rain fed land, what size this land has and how they manage it (own, rent in, 
rent out etc.). In addition to this they are asked to rate their first, second and third most 
important crop in each of the three categories of land. This type of questioning implies that we 
do not know the exact amount of land a poppy cultivating farmer dedicates to growing poppy. 
To estimate the size of the Afghan opium production in 2005 some assumptions on the 
distribution of land had to be made. Four different estimates are presented, named A, B, C and 
D. All results by province can be found in table 4 below, compared to the estimate of 
UNODC. 
The estimates 
The first estimation of the 2005 opium production by use of the NRVA data was done two 
years ago in a preliminary paper by Lind, Moene and Willumsen (2008). As the researchers 
expected UNODC’s estimates to be high, they created an algorithm that would give high 
estimates.
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(A)  NRVA-estimate: Exaggerated splitting 
• If opium poppy was the respondent’s most important crop, all land was used for poppy 
cultivation, irrespective of rest of the crop listings. 
• If opium poppy was the second most important crop, 1/2 of available land was used 
for poppy cultivation, irrespective of rest of the crop listings. 
• If opium poppy was the third most important crop, 1/3 of available land was used for 
poppy cultivation, irrespective of rest of the crop listings.  
This estimation gave a total of 158 516 hectares of poppy cultivation in 2005. This estimate 
clearly exaggerates the size of production, even outperforming the UNODC estimates by large 
numbers. 
I have made three estimates, B, C and D, that I find more plausible based on somewhat 
different assumptions. This has resulted in one rather high, one low and one mean estimate. In 
the three following estimates, ten observations have been excluded due to misspecifications in 
the data set. After scaling up these observations to national levels, the exclusion led to 1445  
hectares of land being skipped, or 222 hectares of poppy fields by estimate D. This is a rather 
small amount compared to the total and the dropping of these observations is not important 
for the final results. 
(B) NRVA-estimate: Equal splitting 
This estimate is calculated by splitting the agricultural land of the respondents into equally 
large parts of each crop, irrespective of the crop rating. 
• If the respondent only lists one crop, all of his land is cultivated with this crop. 
• If the respondent only lists two crops, he splits his land in half between the two.  
• If the respondent lists three crops, he spends one third of his land on each of the three 
crops. 
The estimate gives a total of 590 hectares of poppy in the survey, or 105 491 hectares of 
poppy nationwide after scaling it up with the household weight provided in the data set. The 
estimate has a standard error of 0,000150. This is close to the UNODC estimate of 104 000 
hectares, but the equal splitting between crops is a strong assumption and the way I see it the 
estimate is plausible but not very likely. 
23 
 
(C) NRVA-estimate: Unequal splitting 
My second estimate is calculated by splitting the respondents’ land into different parts where 
the first most important crop gets a much higher share of land than the second and so on. 
• If the respondent only lists one crop, all of his land is cultivated with this crop. 
• If the respondent lists two crops, he cultivates his first most important crop on 75 % of 
his land and his second most important crop on the remaining 25 %. 
• If the respondent lists three crops, he cultivates his most important crop on 60 % of his 
land, his second most important crop on 30 % of his land and the remaining 10 % on 
his third most important crop. 
The estimate yields poppy cultivation of 459 hectares in the data set, or 77 510 hectares in 
total. The standard error is 0,000116. This is a much lower estimate on the Afghan opium 
production of 2005 than what the UNODC claims. The difference in the crop shares might be 
too large, but the estimate is absolutely plausible in my eyes. 
(D) NRVA-estimate: Discretionary splitting 
In my third estimate, I have calculated that the respondents split their land in different shares 
according to the crop listing but the shares are more equal than in the previous estimation. By 
making an estimate where the crop shares are somewhere in between estimate B and C, I try 
to catch how the average poppy farmer splits his land and so get the best estimate of poppy 
size from the data. This way I have created an estimate that I find most likely. 
• If the respondent only lists one crop, all of his land is cultivated with this crop. 
• If the respondent lists two crops, he cultivates his first most important crop on 60 % of 
his land and his second most important crop on 40 % of his land.  
• If the respondent lists three crops, he cultivates his first most important crop on 50 % 
of his land, his second most important crop on 33,33 % of his land and his third most 
important crop on 16,67 of his land. 
This gives a total of 487 hectares of poppy in the survey and 84 007 hectares of poppy in the 
country as a whole. The standard error is 0,000114. This estimate is low compared to the 
estimates of UNODC. Still, assuming that the algorithm of crop sharing is fairly correct, 
covering how the average farmer splits his land between different crops, and the fact that the 
NRVA survey includes a large number of households and covers all parts of the country, 
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estimate D should give a good picture of the opium situation in Afghanistan in 2005. This is 
of course dependent on the previously stated assumption that the respondents do not have an 
incentive to lie. The estimated 84 0007 hectares of poppy means that 1,99 % of all agricultural 
land in Afghanistan is cultivated with the illicit crop. Estimate D is the estimate used for the 
further analysis. 
5.1.2 Provinces 
According to my estimations from the NRVA survey, only 13 of the 32 provinces in 
Afghanistan had registered poppy cultivation in 2005. The top-5 poppy producing provinces 
are Helmand, Balkh, Kandahar, Faryab and Takhar, but both Farah and Badakhshan are close 
behind. Helmand was by far the largest producer, contributing to a massive 63 % of the total 
quantum. No more than 45 of the about 400 districts of Afghanistan was cultivating opium 
poppy according to my data. 
Table 4: Opium poppy cultivation in 2005, UNODC vs. NRVA-estimates A, B, C and D, 
by province (hectares) 
Province Poppy 
cultivation (ha), 
UNODC 
Poppy 
cultivation 
(ha), NRVA 
(A) 
Poppy 
cultivation 
(ha), NRVA 
(B) 
Poppy 
cultivation 
(ha), NRVA 
(C) 
Poppy 
cultivation 
(ha), NRVA 
(D) 
Badakhshan 7 370 2 261 1 468 1 613 1 521 
Badghis 2 967 - - - - 
Baghlan 2 563 93 93 28 47 
Balkh 10 837 36 238 20 212 19 158 18 765 
Bamyan 126 - - - - 
Farah 10 240 2 116 1 716 1 436 1 605 
Faryab 2665 2 990 2 058 2 060 2 061 
Ghazni - - - - - 
Ghor 2 689 529 529 328 449 
Helmand 26 500 103 514 73 396 46 189 53 156 
Herat 1 924 113 113 55 87 
Jawzjan 1 748 - - - - 
Kabul - - - - - 
Kandahar 12 989 2 990 2 102 2 037 2 063 
Kapisa 115 - - - - 
Khost - - - - - 
Kunar 1 059 - - - - 
Kunduz 275 - - - - 
Laghman 274 - - - - 
Logar - - - - - 
Nangarhar 1 093 2 262 946 1 494 1 230 
Nimroz 1 690 - - - - 
Nuristan 1 554 - - - - 
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Paktika - - - - - 
Paktya - - - - - 
Parwan - - - - - 
Samangan 3 874 217 205 205 205 
Sari Pul 3 227 - - - - 
Takhar 1 364 3 234 1 175 1 931 1 662 
Uruzgan 4 605 1 959 1 478 977 1 156 
Wardak 106 - - - - 
Zabul 2 053 - - - - 
Total 103 907 158 516 105 491 77 510 84  007 
 
 
The biggest difference in absolute terms between my estimates and the UNODC-estimates are 
found in Helmand and Kandahar. Kandahar is registered as the second largest producer of 
illicit opium in the Afghan Opium Survey 2005 (UNODC, 2005), with a staggering poppy 
cultivation of 12 989 hectares. However, according to estimate D the cultivation was no larger 
than 2 064 hectares. Helmand on the other hand is registered with a production substantially 
higher by the NRVA data than by UNODC-estimation. A possible explanation to the huge 
difference in this particular case could lie in the weighting of the NRVA data. According to 
the ground survey the population in Helmand is 1, 87 million people, while the Central 
Statistics Office of Afghanistan operates with a population of 780 000 in the same province.3
According to the Central Statistics Office in Afghanistan the country’s population was 22,1 
million people in 2005. In the NRVA survey the population is 28,9 million. Assuming that the 
Central Statistics Office is correct, my estimates of the poppy cultivation should be about 24 
% lower. That would give an opium poppy cultivation of 64 131 hectares in 2005, using 
estimate D. Other sources operates with different population numbers, making it difficult to 
draw any conclusions on the subject, but for the following I will go on assuming that the 
population weight in the NRVA dataset is correct.  
 
As the poppy cultivation is weighted by the number of households in my estimates, some of 
the diversity could be explained by the differences in population counts. Other provinces do 
not show population size irregularities to the same extent, but it does seem to be great 
uncertainty around the issue of both national and provincial population in the country.  
                                                 
 
 
3 http://www.cso.gov.af/demography/population.html 
Source: UNODC, 2005 
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5.1.3 Opium poppy farmers 
527 respondents put opium as one of their three most important crops in the NRVA survey. 
Map 1 shows the poppy farmers’ location in Afghanistan. When scaled up, this amounts to 
89 257 households in Afghanistan. Note that this number is not based on any assumptions but 
rather the number of households that have responded confirmative to the question of poppy 
cultivation in the NRVA survey. The 89 257 households amounts to 678 550 people when 
multiplied by average family size in the sample. According to UNODC the numbers should be 
substantially higher; 309 000 households or about 2 million people.  
 
  
Source: Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS) 
http://www.aims.org.af/ssroots.aspx?seckeyt=295 
The top-5 provinces in number of poppy farmers are Helmand, Balkh, Uruzgan, Nangarhar 
and Kandahar. The top district is Kajaki, situated in Helmand, with an estimated 9 936 poppy 
farmers. 
Map 1: Poppy farmers in 
NRVA survey 
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Table 5: Opium poppy cultivating households in 2005 from NRVA-survey, by province 
Province Total number of 
poppy  farming 
households, 2005 
Average size of 
poppy field per 
poppy cultivating 
household (ha) 
Badakhshan 2 688 0,57 
Badghis - - 
Baghlan 127 0,37 
Balkh 14 971 1,25 
Bamyan - - 
Farah 1 419 1,13 
Faryab 2 730 0,75 
Ghazni - - 
Ghor 882 0,51 
Helmand 49 248 1,08 
Herat 388 0,22 
Jawzjan - - 
Kabul - - 
Kandahar 2 948 0,70 
Kapisa - - 
Khost - - 
Kunar - - 
Kunduz - - 
Laghman - - 
Logar - - 
Nangarhar 5 418 0,23 
Nimroz - - 
Nuristan - - 
Paktika - - 
Paktya - - 
Parwan - - 
Samangan 342 0,60 
Sari Pul - - 
Takhar 902 1,84 
Uruzgan 7 194 0,16 
Wardak - - 
Zabul - - 
Total 89 257 0,94 
 
The Afghan Opium Survey 2005 (UNODC, 2005) does not provide detailed information on 
opium farmers by province, but they do have regional numbers. Table 6 shows a comparison 
of UNODC’s number of poppy farmers in Afghanistan with the poppy farmers of the NRVA 
survey by region. It does also give an overview of the mean poppy field size per farmer. 
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Table 6: Opium poppy cultivation in 2005, UNODC-estimate compared to NRVA-
estimate D, by region 
Region Total 
number of 
poppy 
farming 
households 
UNODC 
Total 
number of 
poppy 
farming 
households  
NRVA 
Poppy 
cultivation 
(ha), 
UNODC 
Poppy 
cultivation 
(ha), 
NRVA 
Average 
size of 
poppy field 
per poppy 
cultivating 
household 
(ha) 
UNODC 
Average 
size of 
poppy field 
per poppy 
cultivating 
household 
(ha)  
NRVA 
Central - - 106 - - - 
Eastern 22 169 5 418 4 095 1 230 0,17 0,23 
North-Eastern 37 241 3 590 8 734 3 183 0,25 0,89 
Northern 101 266 18 170 28 282 21 078 0,27 1,16 
Southern 89 468 59 390 46 147 56 375 0,33 0,95 
Western 58 869 2 689 16 543 2 141 0,32 0,80 
Total 309 013 89 257 103 907 84 007 0,34 0,94 
 
 
5.1.4 The actors of the industry 
The NRVA survey includes questions about income earnings. The respondents are asked to 
state what kind of activities that generate income for the household and how many people that 
are involved in these activities. Among the alternatives are production/sales of opium and 
opium wage. I have interpreted this first category to involve the people that produce and sell 
opium and the second category to involve the people that do itinerant work on other farmers’ 
poppy fields. By using the variable describing how many people in each household that is 
involved in the income generating activity, I can get a better estimate on the actual number of 
individuals involved in the opium industry.  
Opium wage earners 
369 respondents report to have opium wage as an income source. 577 individuals within these 
households are involved in this activity. This is estimated to 89 848 individuals in total in 
Afghanistan. The top provinces are similar to the top poppy farmer-provinces. Still, only 
7 520 of the 89 848 individuals come from poppy cultivating households.  
 
 
Source: UNODC, 2005 
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Opium income earners 
671 respondents report to have income from production or sales of opium. I have further 
divided them into following groups: 
• The farmers: households that cultivate opium on their land and earns income from it: 
69 113 households, 197 102 individuals within these households. 
• The traders: households that have income from production/sales of opium but no 
poppy cultivation: 43 747 households, 91 248 individuals. 
• Poppy farmers with no opium income: farmers that cultivate opium, but does not 
report any income from this activity. This is estimated to 18 800 households in 
Afghanistan. To get the number of individuals involved in poppy cultivation in this 
category, I have multiplied the number of respondents by the average of individuals 
involved in opium production in “the cultivators”-category; 2,83. This gives a total 
number of 53 204 individuals in this category. I will get back to the characteristics of 
these farmers in chapter 6. 
All together, the number of people involved in the Afghan opium industry is 430 811. This 
estimate is much lower than the UNODC estimate of 2 million people. Some of the 
explanation for the difference may lie in the fact that the UNODC has multiplied the number 
of opium cultivating households by the average family size to get their number. But, at the 
same time, they have not included families living of income from other sides of the opium 
industry, like the traders and the itinerant workers. 
When looking at households with income from the opium industry instead of just poppy 
cultivation, the number of “opium-free” provinces is down to just one; Nimroz. All other 
provinces in Afghanistan have families living of income from the opium industry, either 
through cultivation, selling or itinerant work on other poppy cultivating farms.  
5.1.5 Traders 
The fact that the Afghan opium business is an illegal industry makes it difficult to monitor. 
Being Afghanistan’s number one export good implies that a large number of people must be 
making money in the industry without being a poppy cultivator. These opium refiners, traders, 
transporters, cross-border smugglers and salaam-dealers are not registered in any statistics and 
this makes it difficult to estimate the true impact of the opium industry on the Afghan 
economy. Without being able to separate the different categories of non-cultivators mentioned 
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above, I have still tried to make a rough estimation of the total number of them. This was 
done by summing the number of respondents that do not cultivate poppy but still earn an 
income from production or sales of opium. I’ve called them opium traders, but note that they 
could just as well belong to one of the other categories of non-cultivators, such as refiners or 
smugglers. As mentioned above the total number of households in this category is 43 747. 
The characteristics of this group will be further examined in chapter 6. 
Table 7: Traders (households that have income from opium production or sales, but do 
not cultivate poppy) in 2005, by province 
Province Opium traders 
(households) 
Badakhshan 1 280 
Badghis 777 
Baghlan 4 448 
Balkh 2 492 
Bamyan  - 
Farah 1032 
Faryab 650 
Ghazni 250 
Ghor 126 
Helmand 24 840 
Herat 130 
Jawzjan 181 
Kabul 798 
Kandahar 693 
Kapisa 127 
Khost 127 
Kunar 252 
Kunduz 384 
Laghman - 
Logar - 
Nangarhar 1 290 
Nimroz - 
Nuristan 60 
Paktika 555 
Paktya 123 
Parwan 228 
Samangan 342 
Sari Pul 600 
Takhar 324 
Uruzgan 993 
Wardak 645 
Zabul - 
Total 43 747 
 
It is registered opium traders in 28 of the 34 provinces in the survey. It is about 10 times as 
many traders in Helmand as in Balkh, at the same time as the poppy cultivation is almost 3 
times higher in Helmand than in Balkh. While the province of Baghlan is the smallest 
producer of the entire poppy cultivating provinces it still has the second largest number of 
opium traders. Helmand’s location in close proximity to both Pakistan and Iran is important 
for the opium industry in the province. Besides being the largest producer it is also an 
important transit-route for opium coming from other provinces on its way to the international 
market (Pain, 2006). The reasons for the large numbers of traders in Baghlan are less clear. 
UNODC’s Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2005 (UNODC, 2005) reports a number of production 
facilities in the province in 2005, but no more than in Badakhshan and Nangarhar, provinces 
that also have border crossings for opium smugglers. The reason for the large number of so-
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called traders could be that smuggling routes for opium from other provinces passes through 
Baghlan on its way to the international borders. It could also be that there are more heroin 
refineries in the province than what was verified by UNODC. 
5.1.6 Eradication 
The NRVA survey includes one question on the experience of eradication. When asking about 
the respondents’ experience of negative shocks in the previous twelve months, the 
questionnaire includes the experience of opium eradication. As having some or all of the 
season’s harvest destroyed by eradication hardly can be seen as anything but a negative shock, 
a confirmative response of the households on this question should be a good proxy for the 
number of eradication episodes.  
2086 respondents claim to have been experiencing eradication in the previous twelve months. 
This is a total of 298 566 families when scaling up to national levels. By assuming that a 
farmer experiencing eradication will have his entire poppy field destroyed, I should be able to 
estimate the total number of eradicated hectares by multiplying the number of eradication 
episodes by the average poppy field size among the poppy farmers. Using estimate D for the 
average poppy field size, I find that 280 652 hectares of poppy fields was eradicated. When 
looking at reported eradications by province and multiplying by the average poppy field size 
in the region of each province, the estimate gets a lot smaller, about 193 000 hectares. Both 
these numbers are high and do not seem very likely. According to UNODC no more than 
5100 hectares of poppy fields was eradicated in 2005 (UNODC, 2005). The high levels in the 
NRVA survey could be a result of the farmers’ efforts to get some sort of compensation for 
lost income from the authorities. 105 of the poppy farmers reported the experience of a 
negative shock due to eradication in the previous year, but still cultivated opium poppy in the 
2005 season.  
When multiplying the number of respondents reporting poppy eradication by the average size 
of poppy field per farmer in each region, Nangarhar and Helmand are the two top provinces in 
terms of eradication. A UNODC and NRVA comparison of eradications by province is found 
in table 8 below. 
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Table 8: Eradication of opium poppy fields in 2005, UNODC vs. NRVA estimate D, by 
province (hectares) 
Province Poppy fields 
eradicated (ha), 
UNODC 
Poppy fields 
eradicated 
(ha), NRVA 
(D) 
Badakhshan 144 5 142 
Badghis - 13 308 
Baghlan 63 1 738 
Balkh 840 13 970 
Bamyan - 158 
Farah 86 233 
Faryab - 3 677 
Ghazni - 8 491 
Ghor - 5 485 
Helmand 1046 59 486 
Herat 156 429 
Jawzjan - 6 227 
Kabul - - 
Kandahar 48 89 
Kapisa 20 1 139 
Khost - - 
Kunar 126 2 434 
Kunduz - 1 275 
Laghman 360 1 047 
Logar - - 
Nangarhar 1 860 15 473 
Nimroz - - 
Nuristan - 1 780 
Paktika - 31 951 
Paktya - - 
Parwan - - 
Samangan 16 205 
Sari Pul 112 8 481 
Takhar 100 8 666 
Uruzgan 126 854 
Wardak - - 
Zabul - 336 
Total 5 103 192 074 
 
 
5.1.7  Farmers that have stopped cultivating poppy from 2004 to 2005 
The question of shocks in the survey also includes the option of a negative shock due to 
stopping poppy cultivation from the 2004-season to the 2005-season. 814 households respond  
Sources: UNODC, 2005 
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confirmative to this. This is estimated to 109 321 households, and does not include the 
farmers that have stopped cultivating poppy without being negatively affected by it. The 
number seems very high, and could be a result of the same mechanisms as in the case of 
eradication. By reporting being negatively affected from stopping poppy cultivation the 
farmers might hope for some kind of compensation or help from government aid projects such 
as alternative livelihood programs.  
By multiplying the number of households that have stopped cultivating poppy by the average 
size of Afghan poppy fields in 2005, the reduction in poppy cultivation stemming from these 
farmers should amount to 102 891 hectares. According to UNODC the reduction was 27 000 
hectares. UNODC claims that Nangarhar is the province with the largest reduction in poppy 
cultivation from 2004 to 2005, an impressing 96 %. Nangarhar was also the province with the 
largest amount of respondents in the NRVA survey reporting to have stopped cultivating 
opium; 36 777 households in total. 
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6 Farmers’ incentives for poppy cultivation 
Although opium poppy is a crop generating higher income yields for the farmer than many of 
the alternatives, most Afghan farmer choose not to cultivate it. The choice of the farmers to 
cultivate or not to cultivate opium poppy seems highly dependent on local factors, and the 
explanations for this diversity are many. This chapter is intended to give a theoretical 
overview of the different factors affecting the farmers’ cropping decisions. 
 
6.1 Theoretical considerations 
6.1.1 Center vs. periphery, farmer’s access to alternative livelihoods 
Through several years of research on the Afghan drug industry, David Mansfield has become 
one of the people most referred to on the subject. He has published multiple papers on opium 
poppy cultivation, farmers’ incentives and alternative livelihoods. On the field of the Afghan 
opium industry Mansfield is seen as the leading expert and he is heavily used by both 
UNODC and the World Bank. In his work, Mansfield stresses his view that the Afghan opium 
farmers should not be seen as a homogenous group and that authorities must take local factors 
into account when deciding upon their drug enforcement strategies.  
One of Mansfield’s explanations why some farmers choose to grow opium while others don’t 
is the idea of a divide between the center and the periphery. In his research this reasoning is 
used to explain the rise of opium poppy cultivation in some areas while other areas have 
experienced a decrease (Mansfield, 2006). The idea is that farmers in inaccessible areas, the 
periphery, will have difficulties creating alternative livelihoods to opium production, as their 
access to functioning labor and commodity markets are limited. The lack of non-farm income 
possibilities means that the households must choose the crop that can occupy either a large 
part or all of the family and yield a high income per worker. The labor intensive nature of 
poppy cultivation makes this a favorable crop when the household size is large but the 
possibilities are limited.  
According to Mansfield (2006b) the incentives to grow opium poppy over other crops will 
increase the further the farmer live from the provincial center, not only due to the lack of 
income opportunities but also because of worsening infrastructure, making it hard to get 
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agricultural products such as fresh fruit and vegetables to the marked in time. In this 
environment, opium poppy would be the preferred crop as opium can be stored for longer 
periods of time, is easily transported to the marked place and at times even collected at the 
farm by opium traders.  
A third argument in the center versus periphery theory is the lack of strong law enforcement 
in inaccessible areas. In remote villages far from central authorities an opium ban and the 
threat of eradication will seem less credible and opium cultivation is more easily hidden away.  
Even though these arguments have an important role in his research, Mansfield acknowledges 
that it does not apply to the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, provinces that 
have been known to produce the largest amounts of opium in the country. According to 
Mansfield this is mainly because of the lack of strong provincial centers in this area. 
6.1.2 The allocation of land and land tenure patterns 
Land tenure arrangements are diverse in rural Afghanistan, where a large number of 
households live in extreme poverty. UNODC estimates that as many as one quarter of the 
population are landless, and the most common land tenure agreements for these farmers are 
sharecropping and tenancy (Mansfield, 2006b). Even for the farmers that do own land, it is 
often not enough to meet the family’s basic needs. For these resource- and land-poor 
households it is crucial to gain access to land to ensure some sort of food security. According 
to Mansfield these tenure arrangements is favoring opium poppy cultivation and we should 
expect to find a strong relationship between opium production and sharecropping/land leasing 
(Mansfield, 2001). One should also expect the typical land leasing/sharecropping poppy 
cultivator to be found at relatively small landholdings. 
In sharecropping agreements the cultivator’s share of returns is typically small, and the 
favorable arrangement would usually be land tenancy, but for the very poorest farmers the 
lack of resources needed for the agricultural inputs forces them to engage the unfavorable 
sharecropping agreements. The labor intensive nature of poppy cultivation has made 
sharecropping attractive for both the landowners and the sharecroppers. The typical poor 
farmer has no other inputs to offer than cheap labor. The wealthier land owners would want to 
maximize the profit from his land, and by sharecropping it out to poppy cultivating farmers he 
can gain high yields on relatively small landholdings and at the same time use his own labor 
elsewhere. Because the landowner usually provides the land, the seeds and the physical 
infrastructure needed to cultivate poppy, the sharecropping farmer’s share of the returns is 
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small, even though labor is by far the most important input in opium production. This ensures 
a disproportionally high share of income for the landowner relative to his inputs. Still, the 
arrangement is often the only way for the poorer farmers to gain access to land and they will 
usually have to agree to the crop decisions of the landowner. The sharecropping agreement 
also ensures risk sharing for the landowners in an unstable environment. In the case of crop 
failure or exposure to poppy eradication campaigns, the heaviest burden will fall on the 
already poor and indebted sharecropping farmers.  
In land leasing arrangements it has been common practice to calculate rent on the basis of 
potential wheat production. According to Mansfield (2006b) this is changing in areas with 
high concentration of poppy cultivation. Landowners are increasingly requiring rent based on 
potential opium production instead of potential wheat production. The high yield of income 
from opium poppy cultivation relative to other crops means that land-leasing farmers have 
limited options when choosing what to cultivate.  
6.1.3 Farmers’ dept and the salaam system 
Through years of conflict, the Afghan economy has suffered and the prevalence of formal 
financial institutions such as banks is limited. At the same time, Islam forbids good Muslims 
to earn interest on money lending, and this has made alternative credit systems evolve. The 
salaam system is an informal system that gives the farmers access to credit from a money 
lender in change for a share of his opium harvest at a later stage (UNODC, 1999). The price 
the farmers receive from the creditors is often not more than half of what he would get by 
selling his opium after harvest, but this arrangement is often their only possibility of obtaining 
credit as the formal economy is non-functioning. The salaam system gives the farmers access 
to income during the winter months and does also give them the possibility to make larger 
investments on their farm, such as the building of irrigation systems. But it will also imply 
that the farmers are obliged to cultivate opium poppy and that a season with crop failure or 
eradication will force the farmer to grow even larger amounts of poppy next season.  
According to Mansfield (2004) this is exactly what happened in the beginning of this 
millennium. An increased use of eradication in the government’s fight against the opium 
industry led already indebted farmers even deeper into poverty. The widespread corruption in 
the country apparently leads the eradication campaign to hit the most vulnerable, as they are 
not able to pay their way out of the eradication. These farmers are resource-poor, often 
landless, and they grow opium to pay of their salaam debts. According to Mansfield this was 
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one of the causes that led the opium poppy cultivation of Afghanistan to grow during falling 
opium prices in 2003/2004. He found that all of his respondents that were targeted by the 
eradication campaign during the last season were still growing opium and that their average 
amount of land dedicated to poppy cultivation had increased.  
In his master thesis, Fredrik Willumsen (2006) analyzed the effect of debt on the Afghan 
farmer’s incentives to grow opium. He found a positive correlation between the level of debt 
and poppy cultivation, but when controlling for factors such as social class and price 
incentives the correlation was less clear. Willumsen claims that farmers have two different 
incentives to produce opium; in most cases it will be the Afghan farmer’s best choice of crop, 
in sense that it is the profit maximizing crop, but opium is forbidden by both their religion and 
their government so there will be a moral cost involved when choosing to cultivate it. 
Secondly, it is for many the only way to obtain credit in order to survive the winter or to 
invest in the infrastructure of their farm.  
According to Willumsen the opium farmers can be divided into two groups, the 
“opportunists” that grow opium poppy to yield the highest possible income and the 
“moralists” that grow opium poppy out of necessity. The two groups will have different 
cropping patterns. The “moralists” will have high moral costs from producing opium and so 
they will not cultivate poppy until their debt reaches a tipping point after which they will be 
forced to dedicate all of their land to opium in order to handle their debts. The “opportunists” 
on the other hand, cultivates opium to maximize profit, and for these farmers the optimal 
strategy is to diversify the cropping, producing both opium and other crops.  
6.1.4 High farm-gate prices of opium 
Many factors will influence an Afghan farmer when deciding what to cultivate, and one of the 
greatest incentives for choosing opium poppy is its high farm-gate prices. In fact, the high 
sales prices are named as the farmer’s number one reason for cultivating opium in 2006, 
according to UNODC (2006). 
In 2003 the potential income yield from one hectare of land was about 27 times higher when 
cultivating opium poppy than when cultivating wheat. By the increased production and the 
decrease of farm-gate prices in the following years the potential returns from opium relative 
to wheat had declined to about 8,5 by 2006 (UNODC, 2006). In spite of the overwhelming 
profitability of opium over wheat, most Afghan farmers choose not to cultivate poppy. The 
labor intensive poppy cultivation will be highly dependent on low wages in order to be 
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profitable. In a relatively small household with low labor force living in an area with low 
population density, the access to cheap or free labor is limited and opium production will be 
less attractive.  
Food security is also a determining factor in the farmer’s crop decisions. Especially in areas 
distant to functioning markets farmers may choose wheat over opium poppy in order to secure 
the household’s access to food during the winter. When the prices of wheat increase, the 
production of opium tends to decrease (Mansfield, 2005). An increased price of wheat will 
hardly raise the revenue of the crop enough to compete with the poppy in profitability, but 
farmers will still swap poppy cultivation for cultivation of wheat in order to secure the 
family’s access to food. 
The farm-gate prices of opium have seasonal variations. The prices are at its lowest right after 
harvest, when the Afghan marked is flooded with fresh opium. The drug’s ability to remain its 
quality when stored, actually gaining value as it dries, favors the resource-rich farmers. The 
relatively wealthy farmers will be able to save the opium harvested and sell it at a later point 
in time when the supply is low and the prices are high. In the same way, the salaam creditors 
will be paid opium from the indebted farmers after harvest and probably save it to a time 
when the prices have increased. This investment-like quality of the drug increases the gap 
between the poorest opium farmers and the resourceful, rich opium farmers. The opium poppy 
may for some be the profit maximizing crop, earning the farmers a much higher income than 
any other crop, while it for others is merely a way of surviving. 
 
6.2 Analysis of the NRVA data 
In light of the exposition in above, this part of chapter 6 looks at the data on the poppy 
farmers from the NRVA survey. This is meant to give an overview of the characteristics of 
the poppy farmers and their incentives for producing opium, and compare it to what theory 
predicts. Table 9 in the end of chapter 6 provides a full summary of these characteristics in 
comparison to the average rural respondent in the survey and to other actors of the industry. 
Table 9 also gives an overview of the average poppy farmer’s access to resources according to 
UNODC. 
 
39 
 
6.2.1 Center versus periphery, farmers’ wealth and access to alternative livelihood 
The data from the NRVA survey provides GPS-coordinates on every household that have 
been surveyed. By using these coordinates in addition to GPS-coordinates of all 32 province 
capitals of Afghanistan, I was able to calculate the distance from each respondent to a 
provincial center. I have assumed that crossing a provincial border is cost-free so that the 
numbers are based on the distance to the nearest provincial capital, not the province capital 
that the respondent actually belongs to. This should give a more accurate estimation. All 
measures are in linear distance, as it has proven difficult to calculate actual travel distance in a 
country with limited infrastructure.  
The mean distance to a provincial center among the poppy farmers is 51,1 kilometer. The 
mean distance to a provincial center for all respondents in the poppy cultivating provinces is 
44,4 kilometers. When excluding the urban and the kuchi population the mean distance 
among the respondents in poppy cultivating provinces is 47,7 kilometers. This shows that 
there might be something to Mansfield’s (2006) theory, but the difference between the poppy 
farmers and the rest of the population is not very large, especially when comparing only to the 
rural population.  
According to Mansfield the theory does not apply to the poppy farmers of Helmand and 
Kandahar. To account for this, I have also calculated the distance after excluding the two 
provinces. This gave a mean distance of 42 kilometers among the poppy farmers and 44,2 
kilometers on average among the rest of the respondents. The fact that the distance is lower 
among the poppy farmers than among the rest of the respondents clearly breaks with 
Mansfield’s theory. However, when excluding both the poppy farmers of Helmand and 
Kandahar, the dataset is severely reduced. We are left with 277 respondents, and this might be 
a too small sample to draw any valid conclusion from.  
Of course there might be other centers of trade than province capitals, centers that lie closer to 
some of the respondents, but Afghanistan is still mainly a rural country with dispersed 
settlements and I believe that a province capital is the best proxy for functioning markets.  
Theory also predicts that an Afghan farmer is more likely to grow opium poppy in areas 
where the security is bad and law enforcement low. To check for this I created a dummy 
variable for the experience of either insecurity and violence or theft during the last twelve 
months. Of course the level of law enforcement could be manifested in several other ways 
than this, but with the limited information we have available this could still give us some 
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insight. I found that while 13 % of the poppy farmers had experienced insecurity or theft, only 
6% of the rural respondents had done so. These numbers supports the theory of insecurity and 
opium being interlinked. However, it is not possible to tell which way the causality goes. Do 
the farmers grow opium poppy because it is the safe crop in an unsafe environment or is the 
prevalence of the opium industry itself contributing to destabilization of an area? According 
to Lind, Moene and Willumsen (2009) there is a two-way causality.  
The theories of poppy production in more peripheral areas due to distance to functioning 
marked was being contradicted by the NRVA data. Mansfield’s second argument in the 
theory is the weak law enforcement in more peripheral areas due to the distance to leading 
authorities and functioning institutions. This is also refuted by the data from NRVA. While 
the mean distance to a province capital among all respondents in poppy producing provinces 
is 44 kilometers, the mean distance among those that have experienced either theft or 
insecurity was 41 kilometers. When excluding Kandahar and Helmand, provinces that 
according to Mansfield have are missing strong provincial centre so that the theory does not 
apply, the mean distance in the poppy producing provinces is still 44 kilometers but the 
distance among those that have experienced theft and insecurity was down to 33 kilometers. 
To get a better impression of the environment that the poppy farmers live in, I’ve generated a 
dummy variable for the experience of a shock that affected the respondents negatively during 
the last twelve months, including the previous analyzed shock variables of theft and 
insecurity. The different shocks included in the dummy can be found in the NRVA 
questionnaire in Appendix.4
                                                 
 
 
4National Risk and Vulnerability Survey – Household questionnaire – Final 2005, Section 13: Household Shocks 
and Coping Strategies, question 13.1, Appendix 
 What I found was that the share of families that have experienced 
a negative shock in the previous 12 months are higher (45 %) among  the hole sample than 
among the opium farmers ( 35 %). When only looking at the rural population, the share that 
had experienced a negative shock was 51 %. Despite the fact that the poppy farmers was more 
exposed to insecurity and theft than the rest of the survey population, a smaller share of them 
had actually experienced any negative shocks in the last twelve months. This could be 
interpreted in different ways. It could be that the poppy farmers live in areas where the 
occurrence of these kinds of shocks is rarer, but I find this rather unlikely. The majority of the 
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poppy farmers are resident in areas known to be unstable. The other, more likely, explanation 
is that the relative wealth of the poppy farmers compared to the rest of the population has 
provided them with better coping abilities to shocks. 
Because the theory of distances had no support in the NRVA data, I decided to take the 
analysis one step further. According to Mansfield one of the reasons why the distance to 
province capitals matter is that access to functioning markets gives opportunities for other 
income sources. Mansfield (2006b) divides the income sources into three different categories: 
• On-farm: income from farming activities when working on their farm. 
• Off-farm: income from farming activities when working on other farms. 
•  Non-farm: income from activities other than farming. 
The first two categories might not be good descriptions of the respondents’ access to 
functioning markets, as this is farming activities equal to poppy cultivation. Still, Mansfield 
claims that the possibility for income from other sources than the opium industry lowers the 
incentives for cultivation of the illicit crop. 
In the NRVA survey the farmers are asked to name their 6 most important income sources. I 
have divided the alternatives into categories according to Mansfield’s classification.  
• On-farm: production and sales of field crops (other than opium), production and sales 
of cash crops (other than opium), production and sales of orchard products, production 
and sales of livestock and products, sales of prepared foods 
• Off-farm: agricultural wage labor (not from opium production), shepherding, mills 
• Non-farm: wage labor, skilled labor, salary/government job, small business, petty 
trade, cross-border trade, firewood, charcoal sales, handicrafts, carpet weaving, 
mining, military service, taxi/transport, remittances for seasonal migrants, remittances 
from family members living away from home permanently, pension, other government 
benefits, rental income, sale of food aid 
I found that 57 % of the opium farmers had on-farm income from other sources than opium, 
while in the total sample the number was 21 % and in the rural population it was 22 %. This 
result is not in accordance with the theory of resource-poor, indebted poppy farmers with 
limited choices and livelihood options. Apparently the poppy farmers uses their farm for a set 
of other income generating activities than poppy cultivation, making them less vulnerable 
than predicted by Mansfield.  
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Only 3 % of the poppy farmers had off-farm income, while 12 % of the total sample had 
income from this category. When excluding the urban and the kuchi population the share was 
14 %. The difference is striking but might not be very surprising. The labor intensity of poppy 
cultivation implies that most of the household members would be occupied with the opium 
production, unable to leave the farm and engage in other income generating activities off-
farm. 
The most interesting result might be the respondents’ availability of non-farm income. 21 % 
of the opium farmers have non-farm income, while in the sample total the number is 63 %. 
Because the possibilities of getting a job within this category probably are greater in cities, the 
non-farm income of the poppy farmers should be compared to the non-farm income of the 
rural population. In the rural population the share was 60 %. When checking the share of 
respondents with non-farm income living further away from a provincial capital than the 
average poppy farmer, 51 kilometer, the share was still about 60 %. It might be the case that 
the households that choose to cultivate opium poppy have limited access to other income 
sources than farming activities because of their residency in the periphery. When choosing 
among the on-farm income possibilities, opium production will be attractive because of its 
high profitability.  
All together, 72 % of the poppy farmers had some sort of on-farm, off-farm or non-farm 
income from other sources than opium, while 84 % of the total sample had the same access. 
This is in accordance with the theories of limited alternative livelihood options for the poppy 
farmers by David Mansfield. However, it could just as well be the consequence of the high 
income yields from opium,  
6.2.2 The allocation of land and land tenure patterns 
Theory predicts that a large part of the poppy farmers should have limited access to land, be 
poor and caught in unfavorable land tenancy agreements. Are these patterns also found in the 
NRVA data? 
Among the 30 822 households in the NRVA survey of 2005, about 16 % is borrowing land 
for agriculture, either through sharecropping or renting. In the rural population the share is 
almost 21 %. This estimate is close to UNODC’s (2005) estimate of about a quarter of the 
total population being landless. 100 of the 527 poppy farmers are either renting or 
sharecropping some or all of their land. This is 19 %. Out of these, only 23 are sharecropping. 
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Because of the way the questions are asked we do not know if the farmers actually cultivate 
poppy on this rented or sharecropped land. We do know that after scaling up the number of 
sharecroppers to national levels, the opium producing sharecroppers’ landholdings were 5 634 
hectares, but how much of it is used for poppy cultivation is unknown. Still, this amount of 
land is only 6,7 % of the total poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2005, a rather small 
number. 
On the other end of the scale we have the land owners. 90 of the 527 opium farmers have land 
that they sharecrop out or rent out. This is 17% of the opium farmers. In the data set the same 
number is about 4 % in the total population and 5 % in the rural population. 
The NRVA data again contradicts the theories of Mansfield. According to his research one 
should expect to find a large share of landless farmers among the opium poppy cultivators. 
Most of these should be sharecroppers. Poor families should according to Mansfield be forced 
into unfavorable tenancy agreements to get access to agricultural land. The landowners on the 
other hand should require that the renting household cultivate poppy as this yields the highest 
income for them (Mansfield, 2001). However, this does not seem to be the case in the NRVA 
date. Especially the high numbers of land lenders among the poppy farmers in comparison to 
the rest of the population in the survey is very interesting. Could it be that the poppy farmers 
in the survey are a more resource-rich group than Mansfield predicts? To investigate this 
further I have analyzed the land holdings of the rural population.  
The average land size that the rural households have available for agriculture is 1,29 hectares, 
and the mean land size per household member is 0,14 hectares. UNODC (2005) claims that 
the average Afghan farmer had landholdings of 2,75 hectares in 2005, a substantially higher 
number than what the NRVA data indicates. 
The differences in the NRVA data and the UNODC estimates are less striking when it comes 
to the poppy farmers. According to UNODC the average landholding among poppy farmers 
grew in the first years of the new millennium, and they estimated that the average land size 
among them was about the same as among the rest of the population; 2,75 hectares. From the 
NRVA data the average land size among the poppy farmers is 3,35 hectares. Out of this, an 
estimated 0,924 hectares were used for poppy cultivation. All though the opium producing 
households in general were larger than the non-opium households, the average land size for 
each household member in opium producing households was 0,41 hectares, much higher than 
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in the rest of the population. The idea of poppy farmers as a poor peasant with limited access 
to agricultural land seems inconsistent with the data available to me. 
6.2.3 Farmers’ dept and the salaam system 
The NRVA survey includes questions regarding the respondent’s access to credit and their 
debt. Unfortunately there is no direct question about debt to salaam creditors. The survey does 
however ask about the household’s total value of loan. It turns out that 139 of the 527 farmers 
are indebted. This is 26 % of all the poppy farmers. Compared to the average population this 
is a small proportion. A total of 40 % of all respondents in the survey have unpaid loans and 
44 % of the rural population is indebted. The indebted poppy farmers’ average loan, 49 912 
Afs, was also smaller than the average loan among other households with debt; 64 500 Afs. 
The indebted poppy farmers in the survey cultivate 54 hectares of the 487 poppy hectares in 
the data sample, about 11 %. Not surprisingly these farmers have smaller amounts of 
agricultural land available, 1,65 hectares per household. What is less expected is the relatively 
small share of their fields they dedicate to poppy cultivation, about 24 %.  
The respondents are also asked about the source of their largest loan. Salaam is not 
mentioned, but opium trader is one alternative. Yet, only 6 poppy farmers put opium trader as 
the source of their largest loan. Another alternative in the questionnaire is money lender 
(hawala), an alternative that might also be interpreted as a salaam creditor, but none of the 
poppy farmers choose this alternative. The absolute largest source of loans was family/friends 
within Afghanistan.  
As mentioned above, the average share of poppy cultivation relative to other crops among the 
indebted farmers was about 24 %. This is somewhat unexpected. According to theory the 
poppy farmers with loans should dedicate a larger part of their land to poppy in order to pay 
off their debt. To investigate this I analyzed the farmers that reported opium poppy as their 
only crop in the 2005 season. All though I have no way of knowing whether they cultivated 
poppy in previous seasons, I will still refer to them as monocroppers.  
There are only 23 monocroppers among the poppy farmers in the survey. The small sample 
makes it difficult to draw any valid conclusions, but the findings are still worth mentioning. 
The monocroppers have on average access to 1,3 hectares of agricultural land. This is similar 
to the rural population but far less than the poppy farmers. 12 of the monocroppers are 
indebted, which is a higher amount than the rest of the population. Still, the high levels of 
debt are not found. The monocroppers’ average unpaid loan was 53 167 Afs, higher than the 
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debt of the poppy farmers but lower than the average debt in the survey. The expected 
poverty, landlessness and debt of the poppy cultivating monocroppers cannot be verified by 
the NRVA survey. 
According to Mansfield, the typical poppy farmer is indebted and has limited access to 
resources. They grow opium poppy out of necessity. The data from the NRVA survey has 
already contradicted this in the case of landholdings and debt. What about their general 
wealth?  
There are no variables in the dataset describing the respondents’ general level of wealth. This 
is not surprising. Being one of the poorest countries in the world with a severe lack of 
functioning financial institutions such as banks, the population’s wealth might be easier 
measured in terms of access to assets. To analyze the farmers’ situation from the information 
in the data set, I have created two groups of assets:  
• Luxury assets: TV, VCR, mobile phone, generator, refrigerator 
• Work assets: motorcycle, car, truck 
Again, my results contradict Mansfield’s. The survey confirms the poverty of the Afghan 
population. A little less than a quarter of the respondents had access to what I have labeled 
luxury assets, assets that are viewed as necessities by us in the developed world. A more 
surprising result is the fact that among the poppy farmers 26 % had some sort of luxury assets. 
This is a much higher proportion than the rural population where only 12 % had these types of 
goods. When it comes to work assets the results are even more striking. Among the poppy 
farmers a total of 47 % had access to these kinds of assets, while no more than 15 % of the 
total rural population said the same thing. A similar pattern is found by the UNODC (2005). 
They explain the high levels of work assets among the poppy farmers by the fact that they 
tend to be younger than the non-poppy farmers and that motorcycles are important status 
objects among the younger generations. To check for this I excluded motorcycles from the 
work assets-category, and found that the level of poppy farmers with access to work assets 
came down to 15 %. But at the same time, the number of work assets-owners in the total 
population was reduced to 5 %.  
To further analyze the wealth level of the poppy farmers, I have included information on 
respondents’ access to livestock from the NRVA survey. This showed that 87 % of the poppy 
farmers owned some sort of livestock. This was much higher than among the total rural 
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population of the sample, where the share was 62 %. However, Mansfield (2006b) claims that 
what separates the resource-rich from the resource-poor on this subject is their ownership of 
higher valued animals, such as oxen and dairy cows. The poorer farmers typically have 
limited access to livestock, with an exception of poultry. By excluding poultry from the 
livestock-variable, I should be able to get a better proxy for wealth.  
It turns out that by excluding poultry the share of poppy-farmers with livestock is down to 14 
%. Among the total rural population in the sample, the share is 22 %. At the same time, 73 % 
of the poppy farmers own poultry while only 43 % of the rural population does. There seems 
to be some truth to the story of the poppy farmers’ limited values in terms of livestock.  
Haj is the annual pilgrimage to Mecca that all Muslims should attend to once in their life, as 
long as they can afford it. Haj is a measure of wealth, but could also be a measure of moral or 
conscience. The data set shows that among the poppy farmers, 17 % had attended Haj since 
last harvest. Among all respondents in the dataset the share was 4 %. This is probably a result 
of the farmer’s relative wealth compared to the rest of the population, but some of it might 
also be interpreted as the poppy farmers’ feelings of guilt for producing a substance that is 
both illegal and anti-Islamic. To check for this, I measured the correlation of Haj to the size of 
land available to the farmers. The correlation between Haj and land size was 0,0552 in the 
total sample, while the correlation between Haj and land size among the poppy farmers was 
0,1766. If we use the size of land as a measure of wealth, the positive correlation of land size 
on Haj could be seen as the effect of increasing wealth on the respondents’ ability to do the 
pilgrimage. The extra effect among the poppy farmers could be a result of higher income 
yield per hectare of land from poppy cultivation than from other crops.   
The correlation between annual income from the most important income source and Haj was 
0,1859, but among the poppy farmers the same correlation was 0,2189. The difference 
between the two groups is no longer very large, but the extra effect among the poppy farmers 
might be interpreted as the farmers’ moral payment for doing something that is against their 
religion. The correlation of Haj and yearly income is even larger among the opium traders, 
0,2442, supporting the idea that there is something extra that makes people involved in the 
opium industry attend the pilgrimage, other than high income.  
6.2.4 Opium prices, income and family size 
Unfortunately I do not have any possibilities of calculating the farm-gate price of opium from 
the data set available. Neither do I have any information on wage-levels in different areas and 
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industries. The lack of statistical material in Afghanistan makes it impossible to obtain this 
from other sources as well. However, I do have information on the respondents’ yearly 
income from their main source of income. I do also have numbers on the average family size, 
information that might confirm the theory of poppy farmers’ larger households. 
 According to theory, the labor intensive nature of poppy cultivation gives larger households 
incentives to choose the crop, as they have better access to cost-free labor within the family. 
In this area the data from the NRVA survey is in line with theory. The mean household size in 
the dataset is 7,37, and for the rural population it is 7,47. For the farmers growing opium the 
mean family size is 9,17. This supports the theory of bigger families dependent on opium 
because of the large revenue and the labor-intensive nature of the opium cultivation process. 
But the larger households could also partly be a result of the poppy farmers’ higher income. 
Mean earnings are higher among the larger families in the sample, and it is difficult to tell 
what influences what.  
The average yearly income in the survey is 67 389 Afs, or about 1 360 USD.5
 
 Looking only at 
the rural population the yearly income was 62 146 Afs. The income of the poppy farmers was 
more than twice as large, 125 963 Afs. When looking only at those poppy farmers with opium 
as their most important income, 253 respondents, the number increased further, to 138 928 
Afs. The income is almost the double among the poppy farmers than in the rest of the 
population, and more than twice as large when looking at the farmers with opium as their 
main income. The result is very interesting, as it confirms the lucrative nature of poppy 
cultivation and questions the poverty-label on the poppy farmers. However, the reported 
income could be gross income, so that a large part of the poppy farmers’ income later was 
used to pay wages to workers helping out with the harvest. Because the survey only asks 
about the respondent’s most important income, it could also be that many of them have a high 
income from other activities not reported, and that this could have altered the conclusion.  
                                                 
 
 
5 http://www.centralbank.gov.af/pdf/Average%20rate%20from%202001-%202007.pdf 
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6.3 The poppy farmers with no opium income 
 There are 116 families in the sample that cultivates opium but claim to have no income or 
wage from opium production or sales. 116 out of 527 poppy farmers is a large part, making it 
hard to just blame errors in the survey. Scaled up to national levels these families account for 
18 800 Afghan families. I tried to look at their characteristics to get a better view of what kind 
of farmers these 116 really were. 
My first idea was that these households were heavily indebted, owing money to salaam-
creditors. As the farmers in this situation would have to pay the creditor in opium right after 
harvest, they might not consider poppy cultivation as an income generating activity. But it 
turns out that only 39 of them have unpaid loans. However, the average loan among these 
households were 120 582, a substantial debt compared to other indebted in the dataset. For 
these families my assumption could be correct.  
To get a better idea of the respondents wealth level, I analyzed the allocation of the 
agricultural land they had available and their land tenancy agreements. 24 of the respondents 
did not own enough land to provide for the family and were renting or sharecropping land 
from others. The average land size in the group was 3,81 hectares, significantly larger than for 
the average farmer in Afghanistan. The mean income among them is 98 818, lower than the 
poppy farmers’ income but higher than the income of an average Afghan family. There are no 
signs of them being poorer than most households in the survey.  
Could it be that they produce poppy for their own usage? In that case, I would assume that 
they cultivate smaller amounts of poppy than the rest of the poppy farmers. It turns out that 
their opium production is about equal in size to that of the rest of the poppy farmers. On their 
land they cultivate 0,92 hectares of poppy, or 24 %. 
Another explanation for the lack of income from the poppy cultivation could be that the 
farmers have experienced their poppy fields being destroyed by eradication campaigns. In that 
case they would not generate income from opium this year. However, only 26 farmers report 
being exposed to eradication during the previous twelve months. This is no larger amount 
than in among the rest of the poppy farmers. Actually, the experience of any kind of negative 
shocks is only slightly larger among this group than among the rest of the poppy cultivators; 
37 % report such incidents. None of them lost their house or land in the previous year.  
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The non-income poppy farmers remain a mystery. Only 5 of the 116 families have not 
reported any income sources at all. These farmers can be explained by the errors in the data 
set or misunderstandings during the interviews. But the remaining 111 households are 
difficult to interpret. As their most important income source most of them, 41 %, report crop 
production for home consumption. Of other income sources among them, production and 
sales of orchard products and production and sales of field crops are most common. I find no 
clear explanation for their lack of income from opium, and the missing information could just 
be due to a mistake in the survey. If the respondents were to be skipped from the sample, the 
estimated total opium production of 2005 would be down to 66 129 hectares. 
 
6.4 The traders 
There are 268 respondents in the sample from the NRVA survey that have income from 
production and sales of opium, but do not cultivate poppy themselves. I have called these 
families traders, but they could also be refiners, transporters, cross-border smugglers or 
salaam-creditors. They are involved in the Afghan opium industry but they are not poppy 
farmers. These respondents account for 43 747 households after scaling up to national levels. 
This is 1,1 % of the total population in Afghanistan.6
Most of the traders are rural, 230 respondents. Only 18 are urban and 20 are kuchi. The 
average land size among the rural traders is 2,04 hectares and the mean size of land on each 
individual is 0,239. This means that the traders have access to arable land, still they do not 
cultivate poppy. They have smaller landholdings than the poppy farmers but larger than the 
rest of the population. 17 % of them are either sharecropping or renting land, while 8 % are 
land owners, renting or sharecropping out land to others. 24 % of them are indebted and their 
average debt is 48 345 Afs. The values indicate that the traders are less wealthy than the 
poppy farmers but  more than the rest of the population. This is somewhat unexpected, as the 
typical picture that is drawn of the opium industry is one where the poppy farmers are on the 
 By looking at their characteristic I’ll try 
to get a better impression on what kind of families they are.  
                                                 
 
 
6 Total population measured from the NRVA data; 28,9 million people. 
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bottom of the social ladder, being exploited by the other actors in the industry. Of course the 
uncertainty of the traders’ actual role in the industry complicates the analysis.  
Another measure of wealth is their availability to assets. 20 %  of the traders have access to 
luxury goods, and 37 % have access to work assets. This implies that the traders as a group 
are equally well of as the rest of the population in terms of luxury goods, but their access to 
work assets are much higher. This is probably a result of my definition of work assets, where 
all items are transportation equipment, and the nature of trading as a profession. 32 % of the 
rural traders have livestock other than poultry. This is more than both the poppy farmers and 
the rest of the rural population. This could also be a result of the traders keeping livestock as 
means of transportation to a larger degree than the rest of the population because of their 
work.  
The income-patterns of the traders are similar to the poppy farmers’, but smaller. 40 % of the 
traders have on-farm income, 3 % have off-farm income and 10 % have non-farm income. All 
in all, 56 % of them had access to other income than opium income. 
The average family size of the opium traders was 8 individuals. This is larger than the survey 
average but smaller than the poppy farmers. Only 4 % of the traders have experienced a 
negative shock due to insecurity and theft in the last 12 months, about the same as the rest of 
the population. 106 of them have been negatively affected by any of the shocks listed in the 
survey in the previous 12 months. This is 39,5 %, about the same as in the poppy farmer 
sample, but smaller than in the rest of the population. 
 
6.5 Farmers’ dependency on poppy cultivation, land-rich versus land-poor 
According to Willumsen (2006) the poppy farmers can be divided into two subsets, the poor 
and indebted farmers dependent on the opium industry to get access to credit and land, and the 
resource-rich farmers that cultivates poppy because it is the profit maximizing choice of crop. 
David Mansfield (2006b) promotes similar arguments in his contribution to the UNODC and 
World Bank report Afghanistan’s Drug Industry, where he claims that a household’s 
dependency of opium poppy will depend on a number of different factors. To analyze this by 
use of the NRVA data, I have created three groups of opium poppy farmers, the land-rich, the 
land-poor and the middle group. To really emphasize the difference between the land-rich and 
the land-poor, I have chosen the farmers with really large landholdings, more than 6 hectares, 
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and the farmers with the absolutely smallest landholdings, less than 0,5 hectares. The middle 
group consists of  the remaining 402 farmers, with landholdings more similar to the average. 
I’ll start by analyzing the middle group so that the characteristics of the two more deviant 
groups can be compared to this.  
6.5.1 Middle group  
(402 farmers) 
Poppy farmers with landholdings larger than 0,5 hectares but smaller than 6 hectares. 
The middle group consists of the average poppy farmers in the sample. Their mean land size 
is 2,54 hectares, and on this land they cultivate on the average 0,77 hectares of poppy. This 
means that about one third of their land is used for poppy cultivation. 24 % of them have 
unpaid loans, and among these the average debt was 60 640 Afs. 25 % have got luxury assets, 
and almost half, 49 %, have work assets. 13 % of the farmers have livestock other than 
poultry. 75 % had some sort of income from other sources than opium. 60 % had on-farm 
income, 3 % had off-farm income and 19 % had non-farm income.  
The mean household size among this group was 9,43 and they live on the average 51 
kilometers from a provincial capital. 15 % have experienced insecurity, violence or theft and 
22 % have experienced their crop being destroyed by an eradication campaign during the 
previous twelve months.  
6.5.2 Land-poor  
(66 farmers) 
Poppy farmers with landholdings smaller than 0,5 hectares. 
These households have limited access to arable land; the mean land size in the sample is only 
0,33 hectares. Out of this they cultivate 0,164 hectares of opium poppy, or 49 % of their total 
land. This is supporting the predictions of Willumsen (2006), where the poorer and indebted 
families goes from no poppy cultivation to cultivating a larger part of their land with poppy 
once they reach a threshold level of debt. Still, the share of poppy cultivation in this group is 
smaller than expected, they are far from monocroppers. 
At the same time, they are not all indebted. Out of the 66 farmers, 38 have unpaid loans. This 
is 58 %, a substantially higher share than among both the poppy farmers and the rest of the 
population. Still, their average unpaid loan was not very high, 23 700 Afs. When looking at 
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all households in the dataset with landholdings smaller than 0,5 hectares, the share of indebted 
respondents was lower, 39 %, but their average debt was higher; 67 700 Afs. Only 8 % of the 
land-poor had access to luxury assets, and 6 % had access to work assets. Still, these results 
are hardly very surprising. These farmers are by definition among the poorer of the sample, a 
group that is more dependent on loans to get through difficult periods. Their poverty and so 
their lack of collateral could be the reason why their average debt is not higher. Even so, the 
poor poppy farmers do not seem worse of than other poor households in the population.  
24 % of them had livestock other than poultry. 27 % had on-farm income from other sources 
than opium, 5 % had off-farm income and 18 % had non-farm income. All together 45 % of 
the land-poor farmers were involved in income generating activities other than opium wage 
labor or production and sales of opium. Even among the poorest of the poppy farmers the 
access to alternative livelihood is present.  
The average family size is 7,68 people, supporting the idea that larger families comes with 
higher wealth, and that it is not necessarily correlated with poppy cultivation because of labor 
requirements. They live 52 kilometers from a provincial capital, further away than the average 
poppy farmer, and 14 % have experienced insecurity and violence in the previous twelve 
months. Eradication has been experienced by almost 20 % of them, about the same as the rest 
of the poppy farmers. 
6.5.3 Land-rich  
(59 farmers) 
Poppy farmers with landholdings larger than 6 hectares.  
The farmers in this category have large landholdings; the mean size of land available to them 
is 12,33 hectares. Out of this they cultivate on the average 2,82 hectares of opium poppy, or 
almost 23 % of their land. This is a smaller amount than in the total sample of poppy farmers, 
where the average was 28 %.  
The mean family size is 9,05, about the same as among the rest of the poppy farmers, but 
substantially larger than among the land-poor. Not surprisingly this group also shows other 
signs of wealth. Only two of the respondents have debts (3 %), 47 % have access to luxury 
assets and 80 % had access to work assets. 81 % of the households have access to either on-
farm, off-farm or non-farm income. However, only one family, or about 2 %, reported any 
off-farm income. This is a low share, but could be explained by the fact that these households 
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are wealthy, so there is no need for the family members to do itinerant work. 39 % had some 
sort of non-farm income, 64 %, had on-farm income. All in all, the land-rich farmers have 
more alternative income sources than the average poppy farmer. Still, only 8 % of them own 
livestock other than poultry. 
The poppy farmers with large landholdings have an average of 52 kilometers to nearest 
provincial capital. This is a larger distance than in the total sample of the poppy producing 
provinces. Yet, there is not much sign of weak law enforcement among them, only one 
household has experienced insecurity or theft in the previous twelve months. It seems that the 
occurrence of insecurity is more linked to poverty than periphery.  
According to Martin and Symansky (2006), the eradication campaigns in Afghanistan have 
had limited effect due to widespread corruption. David Mansfield (2004) claims by similar 
arguments that the eradication campaigns only target the poorest farmers, as they are  not able 
to pay their way out of the eradication. In the data from the NRVA survey, only 3 % of the 59 
poppy farmers with large landholdings had experienced eradication of their poppy in the 
previous twelve months. Among both the land-poor and the rest of the poppy cultivators the 
number was 20 %. Although we have limited data on the land-wealthy farmers, the survey 
seems to confirm the expected negative correlation between wealth and eradication. However, 
the relatively low numbers among the poor farmers compared to the total sample of poppy 
farmers imply that the farmers have to be substantially wealthier than the average to save their 
crops from eradication.
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Table 9: Characteristics of the actors in the Afghan opium industry in 2005 
Characteristics Average 
rural 
respondent 
(NRVA) 
Average 
poppy 
farmer 
(NRVA) 
Land-
poor 
poppy 
farmers 
(NRVA) 
Land-
rich 
poppy 
farmers 
(NRVA) 
Middle 
group of 
poppy 
farmers 
(NRVA) 
No-income 
generating 
poppy 
farmers 
(NRVA) 
Traders 
(NRVA) 
Average 
poppy 
farmer 
(UNODC) 
Land available 1,29 ha 3,35 ha 0,33 ha 12,33 ha 2,54 ha 3,81 ha 2,36 ha7 2,75 ha  
Av. size of poppy field - 0,92 ha 0,16 ha 2,83 ha 0,77 ha 0,92 ha - 0,34 ha 
Poppy field in % of land - 28 %  49 % 23 % 30 % 24 % - 12 % 
Land owners 5 % 17 % 2% 42 % 16 % 17 % 8 % - 
Land renters 21 % 19 % 3 % 7 % 24 % 21 % 17 % - 
Av. yearly income (Afs) 62 146 125 963 64 977 193 667 126 963 95 722 91 685 99 1908
Has non-opium income  
 
84 % 72 % 45 % 81 % 75 % 85 % 56 % - 
Has on-farm  income 22 % 57 % 27 % 64 % 60 % 41 % 40 % - 
Has off-farm income  14 % 3 % 5 % 2 % 3 % 8 % 3 % - 
Has non-farm income 60 % 21 % 18 % 39 % 19 % 54 % 10 % - 
Indebted  44 % 26 % 58 % 3 % 24 % 34 % 24 % 36 % 
Av. loan of indebted(Afs) 63 025 49 912 23 747 16 000 60 640 120 582 48 345 35 9739
Owners of luxury assets 
 
12 % 26 % 8 % 47 % 25 % 17 % 20 % - 
Owners of work assets 15 % 47 % 6 % 80 % 49 % 37 % 37 % - 
Owners of livestock 22 % 14 % 24 % 8 % 13 % 16 % 32 % - 
Av. distance to center 48 km10 51 km  52 km 52 km 51 km 51 km - - 
Experienced insecurity 6 % 13 % 14 % 2 % 15 % 15 % 4 % - 
Experienced neg. shock 51 % 35 % 56 % 7 % 37 % 37 % 40 % - 
Experienced eradication - 20 % 20 % 3 % 22 % 22 % - 5 %11
Average household size 
 
7,47 9,17 7,68 9,05 9,43 7,57 8 6,47 
 
                                                 
 
 
7 Rural traders only. 
8 USD converted into Afs by average exchange rate in April 2005: 
http://www.centralbank.gov.af/pdf/Average%20rate%20from%202001-%202007.pdf. 
9 USD converted into Afs by average exchange rate in April 2005. The average debt is calculated among all 
poppy farmers, not just the indebted. 
10 The average distance to a provincial capital for the respondents living in poppy cultivating provinces. 
11 Hectares of eradicated poppy fields/Hectares of poppy cultivation. 
Sources: UNODC, 2005 
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7 Conclusion 
The Afghan drug industry is not just a national or regional problem. The issues linked to 
opium and heroin misuse and the problems following the grey economy of the industry is very 
much a global concern. The fact that one country contributes to such a large share of the illicit 
opium in the world is subject to great interest. Still, UNODC has been the only source of 
information to important aspects of the industry. Both national and international anti-drug 
campaigns and alternative livelihood programs in Afghanistan base their work on the material 
provided by this organization, making the accuracy of their estimates crucial.  
The goal of this thesis was to estimate the opium industry of Afghanistan in 2005 based on 
alternative data from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA). This work 
indicated a smaller poppy cultivation than what is claimed by the UNODC. But the most 
striking difference was found when looking at the number of individuals involved in opium 
production. As the UNODC claims that 309 000 households cultivate opium poppy, I find the 
same number to be just below 90 000. When summing all the different actors of the industry 
based on the information they have given in the NRVA survey, the number of individuals 
involved was no more than 430 811. This is in stark contrast to the 2 million people involved 
in cultivation only, according to UNODC. The relatively small differences in total production 
compared to the differences in measures of poppy farmers imply that production per 
household should be substantially higher than the organization assumes. Could it be that the 
high numbers of the UNODC are a result of their expectance of the poppy cultivating 
households as poor farmers with limited landholdings? 
When working with the data it became evident that the poppy farmers in the NRVA survey 
were no poorer than the average Afghan farmer. On the contrary the poppy farmers seemed to 
be in the upper part of the scale in terms of access to land and other resources. Their yearly 
income was higher and their average debt level was lower. The results of the research go 
against most of the theories of David Mansfield, the leading expert on this field. While 
Mansfield stresses the poppy farmers’ lack of alternative livelihood as explanation for their 
choice of crop, I find that the most likely reason is their insecure environment. The impression 
of the poppy farmers on the bottom of the opium value chain, being exploited by the other 
actors of the industry is also contradicted by my data.  
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The reasons for the controversy in my results compared to those of UNODC and Mansfield is 
unclear. UNODC is dependent on financial funding from donors, and gaining the attention of 
the international community could be a reason for the organization to report high numbers. 
The fact that Mansfield is widely used by UNODC as an expert source means that the 
organization shares his views of the poppy farmers being on the bottom of the social latter. 
This victimization of the farmers is not a good foundation for the fight against illicit opium 
the way I see it. Security and a stable environment seem to be the key to a sustained decrease 
in the Afghan opium production. 
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Appendix 
CSO/MRRD/WFP – National Risk & Vulnerability Survey – Household Questionnaire – Final 2005 
 
 
Interviewer code  Household geo-code (prefill)  
Urban  Block # (prefill)  Cluster code (prefill)  
Household code (1-12) (prefill)  Kuchi code (0-1) (prefill)  
Date of interview  Province name (prefill)  
District name (prefil)  Name of village/urban nahia (pre-fill)  
Name of sub-village/gozar/mosque   Name of head of household (manual entry)  
Name of respondent if not head of household.   Name of Interviewer   
Relationship of respondent to head of household (Code from Q1.4)    
      
SECTION 1: Household register & 
Education 
[ 
1. Marital status of HH head (selelct one) 
1. Married O 
2. Divorced/separated  O 
3. Widow/widower O 
4. Never married   O 
1.2 Is the head of the household disabled? 
0. No O 
1. Yes O 
 
1.3 How many members of your household have 
been demobilized in the last 3 years or are 
currently being demobilized through the DDR 
programme?  (If none, put 0) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 
 O O O O O O O O O O  
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1. Male 
household 
head  
2. Husband  
3. Son 
4. Son-in-law 
5. Brother 
6. Brother-in-
law  
7. Father 
8. Grandfather 
9. Grandson 
10. Uncle 
11. Nephew 
12. Other male 
relative 
13. Unrelated 
male 
14. Female head 
household  
15. 1st Wife 
16. 2nd Wife 
17. 3rd Wife 
18. Mother 
19. Grandmother 
20. Daughter 
21. Daughter-in-
law 
22. Sister-in-law 
23. Aunt 
24. Granddaughter 
25. Niece 
26. Other female 
relative 
27. Unrelated 
female  
1.6 Can the 
household 
member read? 
 
0. No  
1. Yes 
1.7 What is 
highest grade 
level attained in 
school for those 
household 
members more 
than 5 yrs old. 
(i.e. currently 
enrolled in or 
grade when left 
school) 
 
0 No school –
►1.12 
1 Primary 
2 Secondary 
3 High school 
4 University 
college 
5 Post-graduate 
1.8 
School/college 
location where 
highest 
education level 
was attained? 
 
1. Rural 
Afghanistan  
2. Urban 
Afghanistan  
3. Pakistan  
4. Iran  
5. Other country 
1.9 For 
children 6-13 
years old 
only, are they 
currently 
enrolled & 
regularly 
attending 
school? 
 
0. No –►1.11 
1. Yes 
1.10 For 
children 6-13 
years old only, 
have they been 
absent from 
school for more 
than 1 week in 
past month? 
 
0. No–►Next 
member 
1. Yes  
1.11 For children 
6-13 years old 
only, do you plan 
be attend school 
again?  
 
0. No  
1. Yes 
1.12 What are the main 
reasons of temporary non-
enrolment or  lack of 
attendance? Please rank in 
order of importance up to 2 
reasons. 
 
0 School too far away /no school to enrol in  
1 Works at home or nearby 
2 Didn’t like school / wasn’t learning anything 
3 Went as far in school as they need to learn 
useful skills / education not a priority 
4 Poor health / disability 
5 Not allowed to enrol by family  
6 Not allowed to enrol by school 
7 Security concerns / unsafe inappropriate 
journey to school 
8 Marriage during school age 
9 Cost of schooling 
1.4 
Relationship of 
all household 
members to 
head of 
household.  
Put head of 
household as #1  
1.5 Age of 
household 
member 1st reason  2nd reason   
1 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
2 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
3 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots     1-9 dots 
4 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
5 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
6 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
7 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
8 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
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9 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
10 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
11 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
12 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
13 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
14 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
15 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
16 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
17 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
18 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
19 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
20 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
21 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
22 0-99 dots 0-99 dots O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1-9 dots 1-9 dots 
 
 Can you read a simple message and do a simple 
calculation? 
1.13 Read 
(Flash card) 
1.14 
Calculation 
O O 
 
SECTION 2: Housing 
 
2.1 What best describes your current dwelling? 
O 1 Single family house 
O 2 Part or shared house 
O 3 Separate apartment 
O 4 Part of or shared apartment 
O 5 Tent 
O 6 Temporary shelter/shack  
O 7 Other 
 
2.2 How did you acquire this dwelling?  
O 1 Inherited   
O 2 Purchased  
O 3 Occupied mortgaged dwelling  
O 4 Tenant (–► 2.7) 
O 5 Caretaker (–► 2.7) 
O 6 Relative or friend owner (–► 2.7) 
O 7 Squatter (–► 2.7) 
O 8 Other (–► 2.7) 
 
2.3 Do you have a deed (evidence of ownership 
document) registered or recorded anywhere for 
this house? 
O 0 No 
O 1 Yes, in court/mazkan 
O 2 Yes, in local official records 
O 3 Yes, elsewhere 
O 4  I don’t know  
 
2.4 Have you ever had a dispute over the 
ownership of this dwelling and associated land? 
O 0 No (–► 2.7) 
O 1 Yes, with municipality 
O 2 Yes, with some other Government department 
O 3 Yes, with a private developer 
O 4 Yes, with private person claiming to be the owner 
O 5 Yes, with a neighbour 
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2.5 How was the dispute solved? 
O 0 Remains unresolved  
O 1 Solved without any external help 
O 2 Solved with help of neighbourhood 
representatives or village authority (wakil-i-goza) 
O 3 Solved with help of court 
O 4 Other 
 
2.6 Was the dispute or decision about the 
resolution recorded anywhere? 
O 0 No  
O 1 Yes, in court/mazkan 
O 2 Yes, in the local official records 
O 3 Yes, elsewhere 
O 4 I don’t know 
 
2.7 Do you pay rent to live in this dwelling?   
O 0 No, do not have to pay (–► 2.9) 
O 1 Yes – In cash 
 
2.8 How much money per month does your 
household pay to live in this dwelling?  
|__|__|__|__|__| Afs per month 
 
2.9 Do you have an outstanding debt as a result of 
purchasing this dwelling, construction/repairs on 
this dwelling, advance rental payments, or 
mortgage? 
O 0  No 
O 1  Yes 
2.10 How many years has your household been 
living in this dwelling? 
Years: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 
O O O O O O O O O O 
O O O O O O O O O O 
Months:  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 
O O O O O O O O O O 
O O O O O O O O O O 
 (If greater than 3yrs –► 2.13) 
2.11 How many times have you moved houses 
with your dependants in last 3 years?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 
O O O O O O O O O O 
O O O O O O O O O O 
2.12 How many of these moves in the last 3 years 
have been because of forced eviction?  (Not able to 
pay increased rent, disputed tenure, occupation by 
others).   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 
O O O O O O O O O O 
 
2.13 SURVEYOR EVALUATION Code general 
physical condition of this dwelling: 
O 1 All windows doors & non-leaking roof condition 
O 2 Leaking roof, open windows, doors or walls.  
O 3 Traditional tent 
O 4 Relief tent  
O 5 Temporary structure (good) 
O 6 Temporary structure (bad) 
O 7 Incomplete structure 
O 8 Poor 
 
2.14 SURVEYOR EVALUATION Access to this 
household is through?  
O 1 Footpath 
O 2 Unpaved road 
O 3 Paved road 
  
2.15 Do you have another dwelling that you own 
or occupy at other times of the year?  
O 0  No (–► 3.1) 
O 1  Yes 
 
2.16 Is the 2nd dwelling located in the: 
O 1 Urban Afghan area in same province 
O 2 Urban Afghan area in other province 
O 3 Rural Afghan area in same province 
O 4 Rural Afghan area in  other province 
 
2.17 How did you acquire this 2nd dwelling?  
O 1 Inherited   
O 2 Purchased  
O 3 Occupied mortgaged dwelling 
O 4 Tenant (–► 2.19) 
O 5 Caretaker (–► 2.19) 
O 6 Relative/friend of owner (–► 2.19) 
O 7 Squatter (–► 2.19) 
O 8 Other (–► 2.19) 
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2.18 Do you have a deed (evidence of ownership 
document) registered or recorded anywhere 
for this 2nd dwelling? 
O 0 No  
O 1 Yes, in court/mazkan 
O 2 Yes, in Village  
O 3 Yes, elsewhere 
O 4 Don’t know  
 
2.19 Do you pay rent to live in this 2nd dwelling?   
0. No, do not have to pay (–► 2.21) o 
1. Yes – In cash o 
 
2.20 How much money per month does your 
household pay to live in this 2nd dwelling?  
|__|__|__|__|__| Afs  per month 
 
2.21 Do you have an outstanding debt as a result 
of purchasing this 2nd dwelling, construction/repairs 
on this dwelling, or advance rental payments? 
0. No  o 
1. Yes o 
 
2.22 Do you rent this 2nd dwelling to others when 
not occupying it? 
0. No  o 
1. Yes o 
2.23 For which months do you live in the 2nd 
dwelling? 
J F M A M J J A S O N D All  
o o o o o o o o o o o o o 
 
SECTION 3: Household Facilities 
3.1 If your household has electricity, at any time 
of the year, where does it come from? 
0. No access (–► 3.3) o 
1. Public supply o 
2. Government generator  o 
3. Personal generator (engine) o 
4. Personal generator (micro-hydro) o 
5. Community generator (engine) o 
6. Community generator (micro-hydro) o 
7. Solar o 
 
3.2 On average, how many hours per day is 
electricity supplied to your household?  
Summer |__|__| hrs per day      
Winter    |__|__| hrs per day 
3.3  What is your main source of lighting? 
 0. No lighting –► 3.4 
1. Lamp oil  
2. Candles 
3. Electricity 
4. Generator 
5. Battery 
6. Gas  
7. Fire wood 
8. Other 
Summer  O O O O O O O O O 
Winter  O O O O O O O O O 
 
3.4 What is your main source of cooking fuel? 
1. Animal 
dung  
2. Ping or 
bushes 
 
3. Crop residues or 
sawdust 
4. Firewood 
5. Charcoal 
 
6. Kerosene 
or oil 
7. Gas 
8. Electricity 
9. Other  
Summer O O O O O O O O O  
Winter  O O O O O O O O O  
 
How much 
per month do 
you pay for: 
3.5 
Electricity 
Afs per 
month 
3.6 Non-
electricity 
lighting  
Afs per 
month 
3.7 Cooking 
fuel Afs per 
month 
Summer O O O  O O O  O O O  
Winter O O O  O O O  O O O  
 
3.8  What is the main source of heating for this 
house in winter?  
1. No heating in house  (–►4.1) O 
2. Electric heater  O 
3. Gas heater O 
4. Kerosene heater  O 
5. Firewood O 
6. Stoves burning straw, ping or manure O 
7. Charcoal  O 
8. Other  O 
3.9 Which months do you use heating in a year?  
J F M A M J J A S O N D 
o o o o O o o o O o o O 
3.10 How much do you pay for heating per month 
during winter? (If not purchased – write 0)   
|__|__|__|__| Afs per month 
 
 
SECTION 4: Drinking Water 
4.1 What is the current main source of drinking 
water for your household? 
 
1. Shallow open wells – Public o o 
2. Shallow open wells – in compound o o 
3. Hand pump – Public o o 
4. Hand pump – in compound o o 
5. Bored wells – hand-pump o o 
6. Bored wells - motorized o o 
7. Spring – unprotected o o 
8. Spring – protected o o 
9. Pipe scheme-gravity o o 
10. Pipe scheme-motorised o o 
11. Piped – municipal  o o 
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12. Arhad o o 
13. Kariz o o 
14. River Lake Canal  o o 
15. Kanda o o 
16. Nawar Dand Dam o o 
17. Pool Howz o o 
18. Drainage o o 
19. Bowser/ Water tanker o o 
20. Other o o 
 
4.2 For which months does your household use 
this current main drinking water source?  
 
J F M A M J J A S O N D All 
o o o o O o o o O o o o o 
4.3 Do you pay for water from this current 
main source?  
4.4  
   0.    No  o 
1.    Yes o 
 
4.4 How much do you pay for water per month 
from main source?|__|__|__| Afs per month 
 
4.5 Is there a time in the year when your 
household uses an alternate water 
source? 
 
0. No, main source is used solely all year (–► 4.10) o 
1. Yes, used in conjunction with main source  o 
2. Yes, used when main source is not usable. o 
 
 
4.6 What is the main alternate water source?  
21. Shallow open wells – Public o o 
22. Shallow open wells – in compound o o 
23. Hand pump – Public o o 
24. Hand pump – in compound o o 
25. Bored wells – hand-pump o o 
26. Bored wells - motorized o o 
27. Spring – unprotected o o 
28. Spring – protected o o 
29. Pipe scheme-gravity o o 
30. Pipe scheme-motorised o o 
31. Piped – municipal  o o 
32. Arhad o o 
33. Kariz o o 
34. River Lake Canal  o o 
35. Kanda o o 
36. Nawar Dand Dam o o 
37. Pool Howz o o 
38. Drainage o o 
39. Bowser/ Water tanker o o 
40. Other o o 
 
4.7 For which months does your household use 
this alternate water source? 
J F M A M J J A S O N D 
o o o o o o o o o o o o 
  
 
4.8 Does your household pay for this alternate 
water? 
0. No (–► 4.10) o 
1. Yes o 
 
4.9 How much do you pay for water per month 
from this alternate source? 
|__|__|__| Afs per month 
 
4.10 How long does it take to go to the water 
source, collect water, and return? 
 Main 
source 
Alternate 
source 
1. No time – in community o O 
2. Near community – 1 hour or less. o O 
3. < ¼ day (1-3hrs) o O 
4. ¼ to ½ day (3-6hrs) o O 
5. >½ day  (6-12hrs) o O 
6. > 1 day  o O 
 
 
4.11 What kind of toilet facility does your 
household use? 
0. None / open field / bush (–► 5.1) o 
1. Dearan / Sahrahi (Area in compound-but not pit)  o 
2. Open pit  o 
3. Traditional covered latrine  o 
4. Improved latrine o 
5. Flush latrine o 
6. Other  o 
 
4.12 Is the toilet facility located within the 
compound of your household? 
0. No o 
1. Yes o 
 
SECTION 5: Assets & Credit 
5.1 Does your household own any of the following 
items? (In working condition - where appropriate) 
 
 
1. Watch / clock O 
2. Carpets (Khalin) O 
3. Gilim / Satrangi / Namad/ Fash O 
4. Radio / tape O 
5. Refrigerator O 
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6. TV  O 
7. VCR / DVD O 
8. Sewing machine O 
9. Rug weaving loom O 
10. Carpentry/ masonry tools O 
11. Generator O 
12. Thuraya O 
13. Hand cart (Karachi) O 
14. Bicycle  O 
15. Motorcycle O 
16. Tractor  O 
17. Combine or thresher O 
18. Plough  O 
19. Cereal grinder mill O 
20. Car  O 
21. Truck O 
 How many of the following does your household 
have? 
22. Computers – working  O O O O 
23. Internet users in this household  O O O O 
24. Telephone land lines O O O O 
25. Mobiles phones  O O O O 
 
5.2 During the last year, did your household?  
 
1. Sell a house O 
2. Buy a house O 
3. Construct a new house O 
4. Sell irrigated land O 
5. Buy irrigated land O 
6. Sell rainfed land O 
7. Buy rainfed land O 
8. Rent-in more land O 
9. Rent-out more land O 
10. Sharecrop-out more land O 
11. Sharecrop-in more land O 
12. Mortgage-out land O 
13. Gain more land through mortgage-in O 
14. Gain new water rights to existing land O 
15. Gained access to land by using vacant land O 
16. Lose land because of flooding O 
17. Lost land because returnee took land back O 
18. Lost land because of default on mortgage  O 
19. Lose land by the force O 
20. Improve your property  O 
 
 
5.3 If your household had to borrow money, who 
is the first source you would borrow from? 
0. Would not be able to access any credit  O O 
1. Family / friends in Afghanistan O O 
2. Family / friends outside Afghanistan  O O 
3. Shopkeeper /traders  O O 
4. Local land owner  O O 
5. Money lender (Hawala) O O 
6. Micro-finance Institution (MIFS/NGO) O O 
7. Bank  O O 
8. Opium trader O O 
9. Mortgaging land/house O O 
10. Other O O 
 
5.4 Have you or any household member taken a 
loan in the last year? 
0. No (–► 5.14) O 
1. Yes O 
 
5.5 What was the main use of the largest loan 
taken in the last year? 
1. Agricultural inputs O O 
2. Opium cultivation O O 
3. Construction other than house O O 
4. Business investment O O 
5. Land purchase O O 
6. House purchase or construction  O O 
7. Home improvement  O O 
8. Food purchases O O 
9. Health emergency  O O 
10. Bride price / Wedding O O 
11. Funeral  O O 
12. Other O O 
 
5.6 What was the source of the largest loan?  
1. Family / friends in Afghanistan O O 
2. Family / friends outside Afghanistan  O O 
3. Shopkeeper /traders  O O 
4. Local land owner  O O 
5. Money lender (Hawala) O O 
6. Micro-finance Institution (MIFS/NGO) O O 
7. Bank  O O 
8. Opium trader O O 
9. Mortgaging land/house O O 
10. Other O O 
 
5.7 Was the loan taken in cash or kind? 
1. Cash o 
2. In-kind o 
 
5.8 Will the loan be repayed in cash or kind?  
1.      Cash o 
2. In-kind o 
5.9 What is the amount of the main loan in Afs 
equivalent?   
|__|__|__|__|__|__|Afs  
 
 
5.10 What is the length of period for repayments 
(months). |__|__|months 
                   (If no set time period, record 999) 
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5.11 How much of the loan do you expect to be 
able to repay this year? 
0. No repayment possible  o 
1. Less than ½ repayment possible o 
2. More than ½ repayment possible o 
3. Fully within the repayment period o 
  
5.12 How much of the loan have you already 
repaid? |__|__|__|__|__|__|__| Afs  
 
5.13 How often in the last year was credit used to 
borrow money to purchase food? 
0. Never o 
1. Sometimes o 
2. Rarely  o 
3. Always o 
 
5.14 Have you ever failed to repay any previous 
loans on time? 
0. No  o 
1. Yes o 
2. Not applicable – no previous loans  o 
5.15 What is the value of the total debt value for 
this household? 
|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__| Afs  
 
SECTION 6: Livestock  
6.0 Do any members of your household own any 
livestock, including poultry? 
0. No  (–►7.0) o 
1. Yes o 
 
(Calculate number of livestock below to 
include males, females & offspring) 
 
6.1 - How many cattle does your household own? 
|__|__|__| Cattle 
 
6.2 - How many oxen/yaks does your household 
own? 
|__|__|__| Oxen/Yaks 
 
6.3 - How many horses does your household own? 
|__|__|__| Horses 
 
6.4 - How many donkeys does your household 
own? 
|__|__|__|Donkeys 
 
6.5 - How many camels does your household 
own? 
|__|__|__| Camels  
 
6.6 - How many goats does your household own? 
|__|__|__|__|__| Goats 
 
6.7 - How many sheep does your household own? 
|__|__|__|__|__| Sheep 
 
6.8 - How many poultry does your household 
own? 
|__|__|__| Poultry 
 
SECTION 7: Agriculture & Land Tenure 
7.0 Do you or any of your household members 
own or manage agricultural land or a garden plot? 
0.     No (–►8.1) O 
1.     Yes, own & manage O 
2.     Yes, only own O 
3.     Yes, only manage (–►7.5) O 
 
7.1 Have you ever had a dispute over the 
ownership of this land? 
0. No (–►7.4) o 
1. Yes, with municipality o 
2. Yes, with some other Government department o 
3. Yes, with a private developer o 
4. Yes, with a private person claiming to be o 
5. Yes, with a neighbour o 
 
7.2 How was the dispute solved? 
0. Remains unresolved  o 
1. Without any external help o 
2. With help of neighbourhood representatives or o 
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village authority (wakil goza) 
3. With help of court o 
4. Other o 
 
7.3 Was the dispute or decision about the 
resolution recorded anywhere? 
0. No  o 
1. Yes, in court o 
2. Yes, in the local official records o 
3. Yes, elsewhere o 
 
7.4 Do you have access to a garden plot? 
0. No (–► 7.10) o 
1. Yes o 
 
 
 
7.5 How did you or members of your household 
acquire all or most of this garden plot?  
1. Rent  o 
2. Share cropped-in  o 
3. Purchased o 
4. Inherited o 
5. Other o 
7.6 Does your household benefit from any produce 
grown in the garden plot?  
0 No (–►7.10) o 
1 Yes o 
 
7.7 What is the size of this garden plot?  
|__||__|.|__| Jeribs 
 
7.8 What are the main crops (including tree 
crops) produced in this garden plot, up to 3 in 
order of importance? (Use Crop codes)  
7.8i|__|__|  7.8ii|__|__|    7.8iii|__|__| 
 
7.9 What is the main source of water for this 
garden plot? 
1. Rainfed o o 
2. Irrigated – river / canals / dam o o 
3. Irrigated – deep well pump o o 
4. Spring fed  o o 
5. Kariz fed  o o 
6. Nawara o o 
7. Drainage o o 
8. Absialab / melting snow (flood water) o o 
9. Arad o o 
10. Other o o 
 
7.10 Do you access any irrigated land, other 
than the garden plot, including cultivated and 
fallow land?   
0. No (–► 7.16) o 
1. Yes o 
 
7.11 How do you manage this irrigated land?  
1. Owned but not - cultivated/fallow 
2. Owned & cultivate by self 
3. Owned & employ labourers 
4. Share-crop out 
5. Share-crop in 
6. Rent out 
7. Rent in 
8. Mortgaged-out 
9. Mortgaged-in 
10. Owned & used by others for free No of Jeribs 
1 o o  o o o 
2 o o  o o o 
3 o o  o o o 
 
7.12 Does your household benefit from any 
produce grown on this irrigated land?  
0 No  (–► 7.16)  o 
1 Yes o 
7.13 What are the main crops (including tree 
crops) produced in this irrigated land, up to 3 in 
order of importance? (Use Crop codes) 
7.13i|__|__| 7.13ii|__|__| 7.13iii|__|__| 
 
7.14 How much of this irrigated land is cropped 
twice a year?  
|__||__||__|.|__| Jeribs 
 
7.15 What is the main source of water for this 
irrigated land? 
 
1. Irrigated – river / canals / dam o 
2. Irrigated –deep well pump o 
3. Spring fed  o 
4. Kariz fed  o 
Crop codes 
 
1. Wheat 
2. Maize 
3. Barley 
4. Rice 
5. Potatoes 
6. Beans 
7. Flax 
8. Kgungit 
9. Alfalafa/ clover/ other 
fodder 
10. Millet 
Crop codes 
 
11. Rapeseeds 
12. Sugar cane/bet 
13. Zira  
14. Vegetables 
15. Cotton 
16. Fruit / nut trees 
17. Grapes  
18. Melon/Water Melon 
19. Opium 
20. Other 
21. No crops  
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5. Nawara o 
6. Drainage o 
7. Absialab / melting snow (flood water) o 
8. Arad o 
9. Other o 
7.16 Do you access any rainfed land, including 
cultivated and fallow land? 
0. No (–► 7.20) o 
1. Yes o 
 
7.17 How do you manage this rainfed land?  
1. Owned but not - 
cultivated/fallow 
2. Owned & cultivate by self 
3. Owned & employ labourers 
4. Share-crop out 
5. Share-crop in 
6. Rent out 
7. Rent in 
8. Mortgaged-out 
9. Mortgaged-in 
10. Owned & used by others for 
free 
No of 
Jeribs Seed/seer 
1 1-10 1-999 1-99 
2 1-10 1-999 1-99 
3 1-10 1999 1-99 
7.18 Does your household benefit from any 
produce grown on this rainfed land?  
0 No (–► 7.20)  o 
1 Yes o 
7.19 What are the main crops (including tree 
crops) produced in this rainfed land, up to 3 in 
order of importance? (Use Crop codes)  
7.19i|__|__|7.19ii|__|__|7.19iii|__|__| 
 
7.20 For your crop farming activities, what is the 
main source of traction? 
1. Manual cultivation  o 
2. Animal o 
3. Mechanical / tractor o 
 
7.21 Did this household grow winter wheat in this 
1383/1384 season? 
0. No  (–► 7.23) o 
1. Yes  o 
 
7.22 How much wheat seed did you get for the 
last 1383/1384 planting from the following 
sources? 
Seed source Local 
unit 
1. Purchased improved seeds 1-999 
2. Own stock 1-999 
3. Government 1-999 
4. NGOs / INGO’s 1-999 
7.23 Is the household planning to grow rice in 
1384? 
0. No (–► 7.25) o 
1. Yes o 
7.24 How much rice seed did you get for the last 
planting from the following sources? 
Seed source Local 
unit 
1. Purchased improved seeds 1-999 
2. Own stock 1-999 
3. Government 1-999 
4. NGOs / INGO’s 1-999 
 
7.25 Do you use fertilizers? 
0. No (–► 7.29) o 
1. Yes o 
 
7.26 Which type of fertilizers do you use (fill in 
those that are used – for chemical urea and 
DAP, indicate the Kg’s used in this growing 
season)  
 
Fertilizer  Used Kg used  
1.  Human O  
2.  Animal  O  
3.  Urea O 1-9999 
4.  DAP O 1-9999 
 
7.27 Where do you use fertilizers? (Circle one) 
1. Field crops only o 
2. Garden plot only o 
3. Both field & garden o 
7.28 What is the main source of fertilizer?  
 
1. Own stock/production  o 
2. Purchase o 
3. Government distribution o 
4. Purchase and own stock o 
5. NGOs / INGO’s o 
6. Credit  o 
7.29 Do you use pesticides/herbicides? 
   No (–► 7.31) o 
1. Yes – field crops only o 
2. Yes – garden plot only o 
3. Yes – both field & garden o 
7.30 For your crop farming, what is the main 
source of pesticides/herbicides?  
1. Purchase o 
2. Government distribution o 
3. NGOs / INGO’s o 
4. Credit o 
7.31 In the last year, did you sell any wheat that 
you produced?  
0. No produced wheat last year (–► 7.35) o 
1. Produced wheat, but did not sell. (–► 7.35) o 
2. Yes, produced wheat and sold some o 
7.32 In which months did you sell this wheat?  
J F M A M J J A S O N D All 
o o  o o o o o o o o o O o 
7.33 Who did you primarily sell the wheat to?  
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1. Buyer from the village/city o 
2. Buyer from outside village/city  o 
3. Consumers in same village/city o 
4. Consumers from outside village/city o 
5. Traders/retailers in local food market o 
6. Millers in village/city o 
7. Millers from outside village/city o 
8. Other o 
 
7.34 Did you have a choice to whom you sold the 
wheat to?  
0. No  o 
1. Yes o 
 
7.35 In the year before last (1382), did you sell 
wheat that you produced?  
0. No wheat produced that year (–► 8.1) o 
1. Produced wheat, but did not sell. (–► 8.1) o 
2. Yes produced wheat and sold some o 
 
7.36 In which months did you sell this wheat?  
J F M A M J J A S O N D Al
l 
o O o o o o o o o o o o o 
 
7.37 Who did you primarily sell the wheat to?  
1. Buyer from the village/city o 
2. Buyer from outside village/city  o 
3. Consumers in same village/city o 
4. Consumers from outside village/city o 
5. Traders/retailers in local food market o 
6. Millers in village/city o 
7. Millers from outside village/city o 
8. Other o 
 
7.38 Did you have choice to whom you sold the 
wheat to?  
0. No  o 
1. Yes o 
 
 
SECTION 8: Migration Remittances & 
Social Networks 
 
8.1, 2, 3 Where did wage earning household 
members spend most of their time in last year, 
the main reasons why?  
If no wage earning members living away from 
this household (–►8.8) Skip rule before table, 
so some households skipped before 
answering this table.  
 
 
8
.1
 #
 p
eo
pl
e 
 
8.2 Are the 
household 
members 
working away 
from home: 
 
1. Seasonal 
migrants 
2. Permanently 
living away from 
home 
8.3 Reason living 
away from home 
in last year? 
1 To earn more 
income  
2 To find more work  
3 To get better 
education  
4 to get better 
health services 
5 To get married 
6 Lack of security in 
this area 
7 Joined military  
8 Visiting family & 
friends  
9 Other 
This 
location  
1-9   
Rural 
Afghanistan 
1-9 o o 1-9 
Urban 
Afghanistan 
1-9 o o 1-9 
Pakistan 1-9 o o 1-9 
Iran 1-9 o o 1-9 
Arabian 
Peninsula 
1-9 o o 1-9 
Europe 1-9 o o 1-9 
Other 1-9 o o 1-9 
 
8.4 What is the frequency these wage earners who 
seasonally migrate away from this household, sent 
back money? 
0. No money sent ever o 
1. Once a year o 
2. 2  4 times in a year o 
3. 4 times or more in a year o 
 
 
 
 
8.5 What is the frequency these family members 
permanently living and working away from this 
household, sent back money? 
0. No money sent ever o 
1. Once a year o 
2. 2  4 times in a year o 
3. 4 times or more in a year o 
 
8.6 How much did this household receive from 
remittances in the last year? 
|__|__|__|__|__|__|Afs 
 
8.7 Which months of the year are seasonal wage 
earners typically working away from the 
household?  
J F M A M J J A S O N D 
o O o o o o o o o o o o 
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8.8 Do you have other extended family members 
living in your village or city neighborhood? 
0. No o 
1. Yes o 
 
8.9 & 8.10 Do either relatives, friends or 
neighbors help this household in any of the 
following ways, or does your household help 
others? 
 8.9 Help to  
household 
8.10 Help from  
household 
Type of assistance 
R
elatives  
Friends 
neighbors 
R
elatives 
Friends 
neighbors 
1. General support  O O O O 
2. Finding a job O O O O 
3. Help to pay education 
and medical expenses O O O O 
4. Help with rent and 
housing costs O O O O 
5. Help in paying for 
agricultural inputs O O O O 
6. Help paying off debts O O O O 
7. Lending money or in 
kind goods O O O O 
8. Contribute to wedding 
or engagement expenses  O O O O 
9. Help with looking 
after children O O O O 
10. Provide labour to 
assist household  O O O O 
11. Sharing income 
generating equipment  O O O O 
 
 
 
8.11 How often does your household receive or 
give cash or in-kind support? 
 Give  Receive  
0. Not at all O O 
1. Only at festivals O O 
2. All year round O O 
 
8.12 Has any household member been on the Haj 
since the last harvest? 
0. No o 
1. Yes o 
 
8.13 Is anyone in your family a member of the 
following decision making bodies in your 
community?  
 
1. Male CDC O 
2. Female CDC O 
3. Male Shura O 
4. Female Shura O 
 
8.14 What are the most important sources of 
information (such as for commodity prices, jobs, 
government information, news, health)? (Max 3) 
 
1. Relatives, friends and neighbours 
2. Community bulletin board 
3. Local market  
4. Mullahs 
5. Local newspaper 
6. National newspaper 
7. Groups or associations 
8. Business or work associates 
9. Political associates 
10. Community leaders 
11. An agent of the government 
12. NGO’s 
13. Internet 
14. Radio   
15. Television  
 
1st O O 
2nd O O 
3rd O O 
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SECTION 9: Sources of Income
 
 
Income activity codes 
 
1. Crop production for home 
consumption 
2. Livestock product production  for 
home consumption   
3. Prod & sales of field crops 
4. Prod & sales of cash crops (Non 
Opium) 
5. Prod & sales of Opium 
6. Prod & sales of orchard products 
7. Prod & sales of livestock & 
products  
8. Sales of prepared foods 
9. Agricultural wage labour (Non 
Opium) 
10. Opium wage labour  
11. Shepherding  
12. Mills 
13. Other wage labour  
14. Skilled labour  
15. Salary/Government job 
16. Small business 
17. Petty trade 
18. Cross border trade  
19. Firewood /charcoal sales 
20. Handicrafts  
21. Carpet weaving 
22. Mining 
23. Military service 
24. Taxi/transport  
25. Remittances for seasonal migrants 
26. Remittances from family 
members living 
permanently away from 
home.  
27. Pension 
28. Other Govt. benefits 
29. Rental income 
30. Sale of food aid 
31. Begging/borrowing 
32. Other 
Participant codes
 
1   Men only 
2   Women only 
3   Children only 
4   Adults only 
5   Women & children 
6   Men & children 
7   Everybody 
 
 
Income source 
in order of 
importance. 
9.1 What are your 
household’s income 
generating 
activities in order of 
importance? (use 
income activity 
codes) 
9.2 Who 
participates in this 
activity? (use 
participant code) 
9.3 How many 
people are involved 
in the activity?  
9.4 How many 
days a year do your 
household 
members totally 
spend on this 
activity? 
9.5 Using 
proportional piling, 
please estimate the 
percentage of 
relative 
contribution to total 
income of each 
activity. 9.6 In which months do you receive this income? 
1st most 
important 
income  
1-99 1-7 1-99 1-999 1-999 
J F M A M J J A S O N D All 
O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
2nd most 
important 
income  
1-99 1-7 1-99 1-999 1-999 
J F M A M J J A S O N D All 
O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
3rd most 
important 
income  
1-99 1-7 1-99 1-999 1-999 
J F M A M J J A S O N D All 
O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
[[ 
4th most 
important 
income  
1-99 1-7 1-99 1-999 1-999 
J F M A M J J A S O N D All 
O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
5th most 
important 
income  
1-99 1-7 1-99 1-999 1-999 
J F M A M J J A S O N D All 
O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
6th most 
important 
income  
1-99 1-7 1-99 1-999 1-999 
J F M A M J J A S O N D All 
O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
 
9.7  For the main source of income (the highest number in 9.5) please record 
with daily wage rate, monthly and/or annual payment(s)? 
Daily wage  Monthly income  Annual income 
1-999 1-99999 1-999999 
 
SECTION 10: Household Expenditures 
 What has the household spent (in Afs) in the last month on the following? 
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Expenditure activities – in past MONTH 
Total expenditure  
(in Afs) 
10.1  Bread/nan 1-9999 
10.2 Wheat grain or wheat flour 1-9999 
10.3 Potatoes, rice, maize, barley 1-9999 
10.4 Vegetable oil, animal fat  1-9999 
10.5 Meat, poultry, fish 1-9999 
10.6 Eggs, yoghurt, milk, cheese 1-9999 
10.7 Beans, lentils, chickpeas 1-9999 
10.8 Sugar 1-9999 
10.9  Fruits 1-9999 
10.10  Vegetables 1-9999 
10.11  Food & drinks consumed outside the home 1-9999 
10.12 Tobacco 1-9999 
10.13 Transportation, fuel (vehicle non-business) 1-9999 
10.14 Soaps / Detergents / HH items 1-9999 
10.15 Taxes – formal and informal 1-9999 
10.16 Other/miscellaneous 1-9999 
Expenditure activities – in past 12 MONTHS 
Total expenditure  
(in Afs) 
Number of 
months these 
expenditures 
existed 
Typical 
monthly 
expenditure 
10.17 Payment for medical services/doctor fees 1-99 1-9999 
10.18 Medical items and drug costs  1-99 1-9999 
10.19 Education/school fees  1-99 1-9999 
10.20 Fines or debt repayments  1-99 1-9999 
10.21 Celebrations/funerals/social events  1-99 1-9999 
10.22 House construction/repairs  1-99 1-9999 
10.23 Clothing/shoes   1-99 1-9999 
 
SECTION 11: Cash-for-Work 
11.0 Has any member of your household participated in any cash-for-work 
programmes or income generating programme/projects since the harvest of 1383  
0. No (–► 11.10) o 
1. Yes  o 
If yes, from which programme(s)? 
 
Since 2004 harvest - not last 90 
days 
Since last 90 days 
Programme/project 
type 
11.1 Who 
participated? 
 
1   Men only 
2   Women only 
3   Children only 
4   Adults only 
5   Women & 
children 
6   Men & 
children 
7   Everybody 
11.2 Who 
selected these 
people? 
 
1 Volunteered 
2 Project 
manager outside 
community. 
3 Male Shura. 
4 Female Shura 
5 Male CDC 
6 Female CDC 
11.3 Who 
participated? 
 
1   Men only 
2   Women only 
3   Children only 
4   Adults only 
5   Women & 
children 
6   Men & 
children 
7   Everybody 
11.4 Who 
selected these 
people?
 
1 Volunteered 
2 Project 
manager outside 
community. 
3 Male Shura 
4 Female Shura 
5 Male CDC 
6 Female CDC 
1. NEEP O O O O 
2. NSP O O O O 
3. Other cash-for-
work project  O O O O 
4. Income generating 
projects O O O O 
 
11.5 How many labour days did your household members work on cash-for-work 
projects since end of last harvest? |__|__|__|days 
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11.6 What was the daily labour rate for this work? |__|__|__| Afs per day 
 
11.7 Was the cash payment on-time? 
0. No  o 
1. Yes  o 
 
11.8 How did the cash-for-work/income generating programme(s) benefit your 
household in the last year? 
0. No benefit O 
1. Bought more food O 
2. Paid for education O 
3. Paid medical expenses  O 
4. Paid house rent O 
5. Paid off debts O 
6. Invested in productive assets O 
7. Improved literacy/education   O 
8. Income generating skills acquired O 
9. Other  O 
 
11.9 How did the infrastructure created with the cash-for-work programmes in 
the last year benefit your household? [Prompt] (Select up to three) 
0. No benefit O 
1. Improved access to health facilities O 
2. Improved access to education O 
3. Improved access to markets O 
4. Improved access to electricity  O 
5. Improved access to employment opportunities  O 
6. Improved access to safe drinking water O 
7. Improved access to irrigation water O 
8. Increased agricultural/horticultural production O 
9. Other environmental improvements  O 
10. Other O 
 
1st O O 
2nd O O 
3rd O O 
11.10 If none of your household members participated in any cash-for-work 
programme since good harvest of 2004 was this because: 
0. No programme in area. o 
1. Didn’t know that there was a programme in the areas o 
2. No able-bodied person from this household able to participate in food-for-work project o 
3. Household members did not want to participate. o 
4. Household members were not selected by Male shura o 
5. Household members were not selected by Female shura o 
6. Household members were not selected by Male CDC  o 
7. Household members were not selected by Female CDC  o 
8. Household members were not selected by project manager from outside of the village.
  
o 
 
SECTION 12: Food Aid & Iodised salt 
 
12.0 Has any member of your household participated in any food-for-work / food 
aid programmes since the harvest of 1383?  
0. No (–► 12.11) o 
1. Yes  o 
If yes, from which programme(s)? 
  
 
Since 2004 harvest - not in last 
90 days 
Since last 90 days 
Programme/project 
type 
12.1 Who 
participated? 
 
1   Men only 
2   Women only 
3   Children only 
4   Adults only 
5   Women & 
children 
6   Men & 
children 
7   Everybody 
12.2 Who 
selected these 
people?
1 Volunteered 
2 Project 
manager outside 
community. 
3 Male Shura. 
4 Female Shura 
5 Male CDC 
6 Female CDC 
12.3 Who 
participated? 
 
1   Men only 
2   Women only 
3   Children only 
4   Adults only 
5   Women & 
children 
6   Men & 
children 
7   Everybody 
12.4 Who 
selected these 
people?
 
1 Volunteered 
2 Project 
manager outside 
community. 
3 Male Shura. 
4 Female Shura 
5 Male CDC 
6 Female CDC  
1. Relief food 
distribution  O O O O 
2. School Feeding O O O O 
3. Institutional 
Feeding (TB, 
hospital) 
O O O O 
4. Food for- Work O O O O 
5. Food for Training O O O O 
6. Food for income 
generation O O O O 
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12.5 If yes, how did food-based programmes benefit your household? (Select up 
to three) 
0. No benefit  
1. Increased the quantity of food consumed in the household 
2. Increased the quality of food consumed in the household 
3. Reduced food expenditures 
4. Cash from food sales for non-food items  
5. Cash from food sales paid off debts 
6. Cash from food sales invested in productive assets 
7. Improved literacy/education   
8. Income generating skills acquired 
9. Improved school attendance 
10. Other 
 
1st O O 
2nd O O 
3rd O O 
 
 
 
12.6 How did the infrastructure created with the food based programmes in the 
last year benefit your household? [Prompt] (Select up to three) 
0. No benefit 
1. Improved access to health facilities 
2. Improved access to education 
3. Improved access to markets 
4. Improved access to electricity  
5. Improved access to employment opportunities  
6. Improved access to safe drinking water 
7. Improved access to irrigation water 
8. Increased agricultural/horticultural production 
9. Other environmental improvements  
10. Other 
 
1st O O 
2nd O O 
3rd O O 
12.7 Has any member of your household participated in the any the following 
programme in last 30 days (Select up to three) 
0. No food aid programme in last 30 days (–►12.12) O 
1. Relief food distribution  O 
2. School Feeding O 
3. Institutional Feeding O 
4. Food for Work O 
5. Food for Training O 
6. Food for income generation O 
 
12.8 How many kilograms of each of the following commodities has your 
household received in the last 30 days? 
 
12.8i Wheat flour / bread  |__|__|__|kg 
12.8ii Vegetable oil  |__|__|.|__|kg 
12.8iii Pulses / beans  |__|__|.|__|kg 
12.8iv Sugar   |__|__|.|__|kg 
12.8v Salt   |__|__|.|__|kg 
 
12.9 Did you sell or trade any of the food aid received in the last 30 days?  
0. No (–►12.12) o 
1. Yes o 
 
12.10 If yes, how much of each? 
12.10i Wheat flour / bread |__|__|__|kg 
12.10ii Vegetable oil  |__|__|.|__|kg 
12.10iii Pulses / beans  |__|__|.|__|kg 
12.10iv Sugar   |__|__|.|__|kg 
12.10v Salt   |__|__|.|__|kg 
 
12.11 If none of your household members have participated in any food aid 
programme since last harvest this was because: 
0. Don’t know of programme o 
1. No programme in area. o 
2. No able-bodied person from this household able to participate in food-for-work 
project 
o 
3. Household members did not want to participate. o 
4. Household members were not selected by Male shura o 
5. Household members were not selected by Female shura o 
6. Household members were not selected by Male CDC  o 
7. Household members were not selected by Female CDC o 
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8. Household members were not selected by project manager from outside of the 
village. 
o 
 
12.12 Have you ever heard of iodized salt?” 
0. No (–► 13.1) o 
1. Yes o 
 
 
12.13 Where had you heard about iodized salt? (Select up to three) 
(Do not read responses)  
1. Radio 
2. Television 
3. Newspaper 
4. Health worker (doctor, nurse, etc.) 
5. School  
6. Relative (mother, father, aunt, etc)  
7. Neighbour 
8. Mullah  
9. Teacher 
10. Posters/billboards 
11. Information leaflets 
12. Salt trader 
13. Other 
 
 
1st O O 
2nd O O 
3rd O O 
 
12.14 Why is iodized salt important? (Do not read responses)  
0. Don’t know O 
1. It is tastier than plain salt O 
2. It is cleaner O 
3. It prevents goiter O 
4. It prevents cretinism O 
5. It makes you smarter  O 
6. It prevents mental retardation O 
7. It prevents stillbirth  O 
8. It prevents abortion O 
9. It prevents pregnancy O 
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SECTION 13: Household Shocks & Coping Strategies  
 
In the last 12 months has the household been negatively affected by any of the 
following? Rank the top 3 in order of importance.  
Shock  
13.1 
Affected 
13.2 
Rank 
0. NO SHOCKS EXPERIENCED (go to 13.6) O  
1. Reduced drinking water quantity O O O O 
2. Reduced drinking water quality O O O O 
3. Reduced agricultural water quality and or quantity O O O O 
4. Unusually high level of crop pests & diseases O O O O 
5. Opium eradication O O O O 
6. Grew opium last season but not this season  O O O O 
7. Unusually high level livestock diseases O O O O 
8. Insecurity / violence  O O O O 
9. Reduced availability of grazing areas O O O O 
10. Reduced availability of kuchi migration routes O O O O 
11. Earthquakes  O O O O 
12. Landslides/avalanches O O O O 
13. Flooding O O O O 
14. Late damaging frosts O O O O 
15. Heavy rains preventing work O O O O 
16. Severe winter conditions O O O O 
13.3 Did any of these 3 most important shocks reduce household food 
consumption at all? 
1st 2nd 3rd 
O O O   
13.4 What did the household do to cope this shock? 
Fill in corresponding value for the most important activity(ies) used to compensate or resolve this 
decrease or loss of income and/or assets for each of the main problems listed in 13.2 
 
 1st  2nd  3rd  
1. Reduced quality of diet O O O 
2. Reduced quantity of diet O O O 
3. Decreased expenditures O O O 
4. Increased collection and sale of natural resources O O O 
5. Spent savings or investments O O O 
6. Loans from family/friends O O O 
7. Loans from employer/moneylenders/traders/NGO O O O 
8. Purchased food on credit from traders O O O 
9. Received help from others in the community O O O 
10. Sold appliances, furniture, jewellery, doors, windows, roof beams etc. O O O 
11. Sold income generating equipment O O O 
12. Rented out land   O O O 
13. Mortgaged house or land O O O 
14. Sold female reproductive livestock O O O 
15. Sold house or land O O O 
16. Worked for food only O O O 
17. Worked on relief programmes from Government/NGOs/International 
Organisations O O O 
18. Out migrated to look for work O O O 
19. Joined military O O O 
20. Increased child labour O O O 
21. Sons sent to work as indentured labour O O O 
22. Sold child brides <13 years old O O O 
23. Begging O O O 
24. Other O O O 
25. Could not do anything to compensate O O O 
26. Did not need to do anything to compensate  O O O 
13.5 Has the household recovered from the shocks in 13.2? 
0. Not recovered at all 
1. Partially recovered 
2. Completely recovered 
 
O 
O 
O 
 
O 
O 
O 
 
O 
O 
O 
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17. Hailstorms O O O O 
18. Unusually high level of human disease O O O O 
19. Large influx of returnees O O O O 
20. Unusually high increases in food prices. O O O O 
21. Unusual decrease in farm gate prices O O O O 
22. Loss of employment by a household member O O O O 
23. Reduced salary of a household member O O O O 
24. Bankruptcy of family business O O O O 
25. Serious illness accident for working household 
member 
O O O O 
26. Death of a working household member O O O O 
27. Death of other household member O O O O 
28. Theft and/or violence  O O O O 
29. Involuntary loss of house/land  O O O O 
30. Involuntary loss of livestock O O O O 
 
  
 
13.6 How do you compare the overall economic situation of the household with 1 
year ago? 
1. Much worse o 
2. Slightly worse  o 
3. Same o 
4. Slightly better o 
5. Much better o 
 
 
 
13.7 How often in the last year did you have problems satisfying the food needs 
of the household? 
0. Never o 
1. Rarely (1 to 3 times) o 
2. Sometimes (3 to 6 times) o 
3. Often (a few times every month) o 
4. Mostly (this happens a lot)  o   
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SECTION 14: HIV / AIDS  
 
14.1 – Have you ever heard of HIV or AIDS? 
0. No (–►End of male questionnaire) o 
1. Yes o 
 
14.2 – Is there anything a person can do to avoid getting HIV/AIDS?  
0. No (–►End of male questionnaire) o 
1. Yes o 
 
14.3 What can a person do to prevent HIV/AIDS? (Select up to three) 
(Do not read responses) 
 
1. Abstain from sex 
2. Use a condom  
3. Limit to one partner, faithful to one partner  
4. Avoid sex with prostitutes  
5. Avoid sex with person with many partners  
6. Avoid sex with persons who inject drugs intravenously  
7. Avoid blood transfusions  
8. Avoid injections  
9. Avoid sharing razors, blades and needles 
 
1st O O O O O O O O O 
2nd O O O O O O O O O 
3rd O O O O O O O O O 
 
End of male questionnaire.  Please thank your respondents for 
their time, and say that this will be used for government planning, 
but may or may not result in programmes or projects for your 
community.  
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SECTION 15: Food Consumption – Women’s Questionnaire  
 
0.1 Date of interview  0.2 Interviewer team code   
0.3  Household geo-code  0.4 Province Name  
0.5 District Name  0.6 Village / City Name  
0.7 Sub-village/ Nahia name  0.8 Urban  Block #  
0.9 Cluster code   0.10 Household Number  
0.11 Head of Household Name  0.12 Name of Respondent if not male head of household  
0.13 Relationship to head of household 
(Code from 1.4)  
0.14 Small Village/Gozar/Mosque 
Name  
0.13 Kuchi Code  0.15 Name of Interviewer  
 
15.1 - How many household members were resident and ate at least dinner 
regularly in the household during the last 7 days |__|__| people  
 
15.2 How many meals were eaten by guests from the household cooking pot in 
the last 7 days |__|__| person-meals. 
(Put 0 if no guests eating in the house in last 7 days) 
 
15.3 How many times have meals been eaten outside of the home (not from 
household food) by resident household members in the last 7 days |__|__| 
person-meals 
 (Put 0 if no meals eaten outside of the home in last 7 days) 
 
I would like to ask you about all the different foods that your household members 
and any guests have eaten in the last week (7 days).  Could you please tell me 
how many days in the past week your household has eaten the following foods, 
and from what source and how much?  
 
For each food source consumed in the last 7 days, indicate where each is 
primarily coming from:  
1   Purchase  4   Borrowed/taken on credit 
2   Own production  5   Received as gift 
3   Bartered/Payment in kind 6   Food aid 
 
To check to see that this household is declaring sufficient food consumption to 
supply the basic energy needs of 2100 kcal, use the table below to check that the 
quantities of cereals and oil being consumed are sufficient to meet basic energy 
requirements and there is no over estimating of food consumption.  
 
Remember households with lots of young children will require fewer calories, and 
those with lots of young men will require more calories.     
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Persons in household  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Kg cereal 7 day 60% 2.5 5.0 7.6 10.1 12.6 15.1 17.6 20.2 22.7 25.2 27.7 30.2 32.8 35.3 37.8 40.3 42.8 45.4 47.9 50.4 52.9 55.4 
Kg cereal 7  day 75% 3.2 6.3 9.5 12.6 15.8 18.9 22.1 25.2 28.4 31.5 34.7 37.8 41.0 44.1 47.3 50.4 53.6 56.7 59.9 63.0 66.2 69.3 
Kg oil 7 day 10% 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.6 
Kg oil 7 day 13% 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.5 4.7 
 
Food item 
15.4 # 
days 
eaten in 
past 7 
15.5 
1oFood 
source 
15.6 
Amount 
used 
in last 
7 days 
Wheat flour   1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Rice 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Barley 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Maize 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Beans 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Mung 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Chick peas 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Lentils    1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Vegetable oil 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
 Ghee 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Milk 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Dogh 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Yogurt 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Sugar 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Brown sugar 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Honey 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
 Dried Tomato 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Dried vegetable 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Raisins 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Fresh 
mulberries 
1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Dried 
mulberries 
1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
 Walnuts 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
 Pistachio 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Almonds 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Butter 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Food item 
15.4 # 
days 
eaten in 
past 7 
15.5 
1oFood 
source 
15.6 
Amount 
used 
last 7 
days 
Pasta/ Macaroni 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Beef 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Fish  1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Lamb  1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Goat  1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Dried meat  1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Liver  1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Chicken  1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Animal fat 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Krut 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
 Cheese 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Potato 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Sweet potato 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Onion 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Tomato 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Okra 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Spinach 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Cauliflower 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Eggplant 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Carrots 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Pumpkin/squash 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Cucumber 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Food item 
15.4 # 
days 
eaten in 
past 7 
15.5 
1oFood 
source 
15.6 
Amount 
used 
in last 
day 
Radish 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Turnip 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Cabbage 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Leek 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
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Broccoli 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Hot pepper 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Wild leaves 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Coriander 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Mint 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Apple 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Grapes 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Melon/  
Water melon 
1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Peach 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
 Fresh apricot 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
 ِ◌Dried Apricots 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Orange/citrus 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Pomegranate 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
 Plum 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Pear 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Banana 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Food item 
15.4 # 
days 
eaten in 
past 7 
15.5 
1oFood 
source 
15.6 
Number 
in last 
7 days 
Purchased Nan 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
Egg # 1-7 1-6 1-99.9 
15.7 Are there times of the year when your 
household food consumption is different from the 
level of food consumption that you have just given 
us information on? (If none leave blank) 
 Before 
summer 
harvest 
After 
summer 
harvest 
Early 
winter 
Late 
winter Spring 
before 
winter 
Better 
than 
now 
O O O O O 
Worse 
than 
now 
O O O O O 
15.8  Have you ever heard of iodized salt?” 
0. No (–► 15.11) o 
1. Yes o 
15.9 Where had you heard about iodized salt? (Do 
not read responses) (Select up to three) 
1. Radio 
2. Television 
3. Newspaper 
4. Health worker (doctor, nurse, etc.) 
5. School  
6. Relative (mother, father, aunt, etc)  
7. Neighbour 
8. Mullah  
9. Teacher 
10. Posters/billboards 
11. Information leaflets 
12. Salt trader 
13. Other 
 
1st O O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
2nd O O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
3rd O O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
15. 10 Why is iodized salt important? (Do not read 
responses) 
0. Don’t know O 
1. It is tastier than plain salt O 
2. It is cleaner O 
3. It prevents goitre O 
4. It prevents cretinism O 
5. It makes you smarter  O 
6. It prevents mental retardation O 
7. It prevents stillbirth  O 
8. It prevents abortion O 
9. It prevents pregnancy O 
 
15.11 Could I see the original salt bag or package? 
0. Did not see original salt package O 
1. Saw original salt package- labeled iodized with 
government seal 
O 
2. Saw original salt package- labeled iodized 
without government seal 
O 
3. Saw original salt package not labeled iodized O 
4. Ground Salt, not labeled O 
5. Family uses rock salt O 
 
15.12 We would like to check whether the salt 
used in your household is iodized. May I see a 
small sample of the salt used for cooking?  
(Conduct salt test with the kit provided to you) 
0. No color change o 
1. Color change (blue) o 
2. No salt in home o 
3. Salt not tested o 
 
15.13 Since last harvest, did your household 
purchase wheat grain or flour for eating? 
0. No (–► 15.17)  o 
1. Yes o 
 
15.14 Of all wheat consumed since last harvest, 
what percent was purchased?    |__|__|__| % 
 
 
15.15Which 
of following 
wheat types 
did you 
purchase to 
eat in the 
last year? 
15.16 Why did 
you buy this 
type? 
 
1. Cheaper 
2. Tastier  
3. Only available 
4. Convenience  
5. More nutritious 
6. Other  
Local wheat grain O 1-6 
Local wheat flour O 1-6 
Imported wheat 
flour O 
1-6 
Mixed imported & 
local wheat flour O 
1-6 
Other O 1-6 
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15.17 - How do you compare the overall economic 
situation of the household with 1 year ago? 
1. Much worse o 
2. Slightly worse  o 
3. Same o 
4. Slightly better o 
5. Much better o 
 
15.18 How often in the last year did you have 
problems satisfying the food needs of the 
household? 
1. Never o 
2. Rarely (1 to 3 times) o 
3. Sometimes (3 to 6 times) o 
4. Often (a few times every month) o 
5. Mostly (this happens a lot)  o 
 
15.19 If you are involved in income generating 
activities, can you as women decide how to spend 
that income? 
0. No o 
1. Yes – female headed household  o 
2. Yes - without consultation with husbands/fathers  o 
3. Yes – with consultation with husbands/fathers o 
4. Not sure / Don’t know o 
 
15.20 Would women from this household be able 
to participate in any literacy or vocational training 
classes if they were offered? 
0. No o 
1. Yes (–►16.1) o 
2. Don’t know o 
 
15.21If no or don’t know, what would be the main 
reason?  
0. Women do not need these skills o 
1. Women would not be interested in such classes o 
2. Household duties take up all of their time o 
3. Husbands / fathers would not allow them o 
4. Don’t know   o 
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SECTION 16: Maternal Child Health 
For every married women up to 49 years age in household  
Woman 1 Woman 2 Woman 3 
 Woman’s name      
 Now I would like to ask about all the births you have had 
during your life. 
 
  
16.1 At what age you were you married? |__|__|    Years |__|__|    Years |__|__|    Years 
16.2 Have you ever given a birth that has shown any sign of life?  
0 No  (–► 16.11) 
1 Yes 
0 No  (–► 16.11) 
1 Yes 
0 No  (–► 16.11) 
1 Yes 
16.3 If Yes to 16.1, how many years ago did you have your first birth? |__|__|    Years |__|__|    Years |__|__|    Years 
16.4 Do you have any sons to whom you have given birth and are 
living with you?  If yes, how many?  
|__|  Son(s) (if none write ‘0’) |__| Son(s) (if none write ‘0’) |__|  Son(s) (if none write ‘0’) 
16.5 Do you have any daughters to whom you have given birth and are 
living with you? If yes, how many?  
|__|  Daughter(s) (if none 
write ‘0’) 
|__|  Daughter(s) (if none 
write ‘0’) 
|__|  Daughter(s) (if none 
write ‘0’) 
16.6 
Do any sons not living with you now? If yes, how many?   
|__|  Son(s) |__|  Son(s) |__|  Son(s) 
16.7 Do any daughters not living with you now? If yes, how many? |__|  Daughter(s) |__|  Daughter(s) |__|  Daughter(s) 
16.8 
Have you ever given birth to a boy or girl who was born alive, but 
died later? 
0 No  (–► 16.10) 
1 Yes 
0 No  (–► 16.10) 
1 Yes 
0 No  (–► 16.10) 
1 Yes 
16.9 How many boys and girls died? 
|__|  Boys died 
|__|  Girls died 
|__|  Boys died 
|__|  Girls died 
|__|  Boys died 
|__|  Girls died 
16.10 
Just to make sure I am right, you have had ‘Number’ births in 
your lifetime?  (Write total number of live births in whole life.  Sum of 
16.4, 16.5, 16.6, 16.7 and 16.9 except current pregnancy, if any) 
|__|__| total births |__|__| total births |__|__| total births 
16.11 Are you pregnant? 
0 No (–► 16.14) 
1 Yes  
9 Don’t know (–► 16.14) 
0 No (–► 16.14) 
1 Yes  
9 Don’t know (–► 16.14)  
0 No (–► 16.14) 
1 Yes  
9 Don’t know (–► 16.14) 
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SECTION 16: Maternal Child Health 
For every married women up to 49 years age in household  
Woman 1 Woman 2 Woman 3 
16.12 
Do you suffer from night-blindness (Local Name), do you have 
difficulty seeing at dusk when others can? 
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know 
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know 
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know 
16.13 Did you receive iron-folate tablets? (Surveyor to show tablets) 0. No  
1. Yes 
0. No  
1. Yes 
0. No  
1. Yes 
16.14 
Did you ever hear of any method of delaying or avoiding 
pregnancy? 
0 No (–► 16.17)  
1 Yes 
0 No (–► 16.17)  
1 Yes 
0 No (–► 16.17)  
1 Yes 
16.15 If yes, are you currently using it? 0 No (–► 16.17)  
1 Yes 
0 No (–► 16.17)  
1 Yes 
0 No (–► 16.17)  
1 Yes 
16.16 If yes, which method are you using currently? 
1 Pill  
2 Condom  
3 Injection  
4 Sterilization  
5 Traditional  
1 Pill  
2 Condom  
3 Injection  
4 Sterilization  
5 Traditional 
1 Pill  
2 Condom  
3 Injection  
4 Sterilization  
5 Traditional 
16.17 Did you have any delivery during last two years? 
0 No  (–► 16.23) 
1 Yes 
0 No  (–► 16.23) 
1 Yes 
0 No  (–► 16.23) 
1 Yes 
16.18 
What was the place of your delivery? 
HC=Health Centre,Pri/NGO HC=Private/NGO/Other Health Centre HD/N/R= 
Home Delivery, Neighbour,  Relative 
1 Govt. Hosp./HC  
2 Private/NGOHC 
3 HD/N/R  
1 Govt. Hosp./HC  
2 Private/NGOHC 
3 HD/N/R  
1 Govt. Hosp./HC  
2 Private/NGOHC 
3 HD/N/R  
16.19 Who assisted with the delivery of your last child? (TBA=Traditional 
Birth Attendant) 
1 Doctor/Nurse/Midwife 
2 TBA 
3 Relative /friend/other  
1 Doctor/Nurse/Midwife 
2 TBA 
3 Relative /friend/other 
1 Doctor/Nurse/Midwife 
2 TBA 
3 Relative /friend/other 
16.20 
How many doses of TT injection have you taken in the arm to 
prevent your newborn being affected from tetanus?(If none write 0)   
|__|    Doses |__|     Doses |__|    Doses 
16.21 
Did you see anyone for taking advice during this pregnancy (i.e. 
antenatal care other than TT)? If yes, whom did you see? 
(TBA=Traditional Birth Attendant) 
0 None 
1 Doctor/Nurse/Midwife 
2 TBA 
3 Relative /friend/other  
0 None 
1 Doctor/Nurse/Midwife 
2 TBA 
3 Relative /friend/other  
0 None 
1 Doctor/Nurse/Midwife 
2 TBA 
3 Relative /friend/other  
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SECTION 16: Maternal Child Health 
For every married women up to 49 years age in household  
Woman 1 Woman 2 Woman 3 
16.22 
After the birth of your last child, did you receive a Vitamin A 
capsule during Nefuz/Chell period? (Surveyor to show the capsule) 
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know 
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know 
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know 
16.23 
Sometimes children have severe illnesses and should be taken 
immediately to a health facility. What types of symptoms would 
cause you to take your child to a health facility right away?  
(Do not read responses) 
0 Cough/running nose 
1 Fever 
2 Difficult/Fast Breath  
3 Convulsion  
4 Unable to drink/suck  
5 Watery/Bloody diarrhoea  
6 Other  
9 Don’t Know/none  
0 Cough/running nose 
1 Fever 
2 Difficult/Fast Breath  
3 Convulsion  
4 Unable to drink/suck  
5 Watery/Bloody diarrhoea  
6 Other  
9 Don’t Know/none  
0 Cough/running nose 
1 Fever 
2 Difficult/Fast Breath  
3 Convulsion  
4 Unable to drink/suck  
5 Watery/Bloody diarrhoea  
6 Other  
9 Don’t Know/none  
 
 
SECTION 17: Children 0-59 months 
 
CHILD NUMBER 1 
2 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Child’s Name          
17.1 
Sex of ‘Name’. 1 Boy  
2 Girl 
1 Boy  
2 Girl 
1 Boy  
2 Girl 
1 Boy  
2 Girl 
1 Boy  
2 Girl 
1 Boy  
2 Girl 
1 Boy  
2 Girl 
1 Boy  
2 Girl 
17.2 
Age of ‘Name’ (Record in months). |__|__| 
Months 
|__|__| 
Months 
|__|__| 
Months 
|__|__| 
Months 
|__|__| 
Months  
|__|__| 
Months  
|__|__| 
Months  
|__|__| 
Months  
17.3 
Did ‘Name’ have immunization card? If yes, could 
you show it to me? 
1 Yes, Seen 
2 Yes, not 
seen  
3 Don’t have  
1 Yes, Seen 
2 Yes, not 
seen  
3 Don’t have  
1 Yes, Seen 
2 Yes, not 
seen  
3 Don’t have  
1 Yes, Seen 
2 Yes, not 
seen  
3 Don’t have  
1 Yes, Seen 
2 Yes, not 
seen  
3 Don’t have  
1 Yes, Seen 
2 Yes, not 
seen  
3 Don’t have  
1 Yes, Seen 
2 Yes, not 
seen  
3 Don’t have  
1 Yes, Seen 
2 Yes, not 
seen  
3 Don’t have  
17.4 
Has ‘Name’ ever been given BCG vaccination 
against tuberculosis – i.e. an injection in left or right 
shoulder that caused a scar? (Check for scar mark) 
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
17.5 
Has ‘Name’ ever been given any ‘vaccination drops 
in the mouth’ to protect him/her from getting polio?  
0 No (–► 17.7) 
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
(–► 17.7) 
0 No (–► 17.7) 
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
(–► 17.7)  
0 No (–► 17.7) 
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
(–► 17.7) 
0 No (–► 17.7) 
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
(–► 17.7) 
0 No (–► 17.7) 
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
(–► 17.7) 
0 No (–► 17.7) 
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
(–► 17.7)  
0 No (–► 17.7) 
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
(–► 17.7) 
0 No (–► 17.7) 
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
(–► 17.7) 
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CHILD NUMBER 1 
2 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
17.6 
How many times ‘Name’ has been given these 
drops?  
|__|__| 
Times 
|__|__| 
Times 
|__|__| 
Times 
|__|__| 
Times 
|__|__| 
Times 
|__|__| 
Times 
|__|__| 
Times 
|__|__| 
Times 
17.7 
Has ‘Name’ ever been given ‘vaccination injections’ 
– i.e. an injection in the mid-outer surface of thigh – 
to prevent him/her from getting DPT (tetanus, 
whooping cough, diphtheria)?  
0 No  (–► 
17.9) 
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
(–► 17.9) 
0 No  (–► 
17.9) 
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
(–► 17.9) 
0 No  (–► 
17.9) 
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
(–► 17.9) 
0 No  (–► 
17.9) 
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
(–► 17.9) 
0 No  (–► 
17.9) 
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
(–► 17.9) 
0 No  (–► 
17.9) 
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
(–► 17.9) 
0 No  (–► 
17.9) 
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
(–► 17.9) 
0 No  (–► 
17.9) 
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
(–► 17.9) 
17.8 
How many times ‘Name’ has been given DPT 
vaccine? 
|__| Times |__| Times |__| Times |__| Times |__| Times |__| Times |__| Times |__| Times 
17.9 
Has ‘Name’ ever been given ‘vaccination injections’ 
– i.e. a shot in the lateral (outer) part of upper right 
arm at the age of 9 months or older – to prevent 
him/her from getting measles within last one year? 
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
17.10 
Has ‘Name’ received Vitamin-A capsule within last 
six months? (Show red / green vit-A capsule) 
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
17.11 
Did ‘Name’ have cough and/or fever in last 2 weeks?   0 No  (–► 17.14) 
1 Yes  
0 No  (–► 17.14) 
1 Yes 
0 No  (–► 17.14) 
1 Yes  
0 No  (–► 17.14) 
1 Yes  
0 No  (–► 17.14) 
1 Yes 
0 No  (–► 17.14) 
1 Yes 
0 No  (–► 17.14) 
1 Yes 
0 No  (–► 17.14) 
1 Yes 
17.12 
When ‘Name’ suffered from cough and/or fever, did 
s/he breathe faster than usual with short, quick 
breathing or have breathing difficulty? 
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
0 No  
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know  
17.13 
 
 
Did you seek advice or treatment for this episode of 
cough/fever of ‘Name’? If yes, from where did you 
seek care? (Do not prompt) 
1 Hosp = Hospital 
2 HC = health centre/MCH clinic/Mobile outreach clinic 
3 Dispensary = dispensary/pharmacy/drug seller 
4 CHW = community health worker 
5 PP/TH  = Private practitioner/traditional healer 
6 Rel/other  = Relative/other 
7 None/DK 
1 Hospital 
2 HC  
3 Dispensary   
4 CHW  
5 PP/TH 
6 Rel/other  
7 None/DK  
1 Hospital 
2 HC  
3 Dispensary   
4 CHW  
5 PP/TH 
6 Rel/other  
7 None/DK  
1 Hospital 
2 HC  
3 Dispensary   
4 CHW  
5 PP/TH 
6 Rel/other  
7 None/DK  
1 Hospital 
2 HC  
3 Dispensary   
4 CHW  
5 PP/TH 
6 Rel/other  
7 None/DK  
1 Hospital 
2 HC  
3 Dispensary   
4 CHW  
5 PP/TH 
6 Rel/other  
7 None/DK  
1 Hospital 
2 HC  
3 Dispensary   
4 CHW  
5 PP/TH 
6 Rel/other  
7 None/DK  
1 Hospital 
2 HC  
3 Dispensary   
4 CHW  
5 PP/TH 
6 Rel/other  
7 None/DK  
1 Hospital 
2 HC  
3 Dispensary   
4 CHW  
5 PP/TH 
6 Rel/other  
7 None/DK  
Following questions to be asked for 0-23 months old children         
17.14 
Is ‘Name’ still being breastfed? 0 No   
1 Yes 
0 No   
1 Yes 
0 No   
1 Yes 
0 No   
1 Yes 
0 No   
1 Yes 
0 No   
1 Yes 
0 No   
1 Yes 
0 No   
1 Yes 
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2 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
17.15 
How soon after ‘Name’ was born did you start to 
breastfeed him/her? 
1 Within 6 hrs  
2 6-23 hours   
3 24-48 hours  
4 48+ hours  
9 Don’t know  
1 Within 6 hrs  
2 6-23 hours   
3 24-48 hours  
4 48+ hours  
9 Don’t know 
1 Within 6 hrs  
2 6-23 hours   
3 24-48 hours  
4 48+ hours  
9 Don’t know 
1 Within 6 hrs  
2 6-23 hours   
3 24-48 hours  
4 48+ hours  
9 Don’t know 
1 Within 6 hrs  
2 6-23 hours   
3 24-48 hours  
4 48+ hours  
9 Don’t know 
1 Within 6 hrs  
2 6-23 hours   
3 24-48 hours  
4 48+ hours  
9 Don’t know 
1 Within 6 hrs  
2 6-23 hours   
3 24-48 hours  
4 48+ hours  
9 Don’t know 
1 Within 6 hrs  
2 6-23 hours   
3 24-48 hours  
4 48+ hours  
9 Don’t know 
17.16 
Did you expel some of the breast milk before giving 
it to ‘Name’ for the first time? 
0 No   
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know 
0 No   
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know 
0 No   
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know 
0 No   
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know 
0 No   
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know 
0 No   
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know 
0 No   
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know 
0 No   
1 Yes 
9 Don’t know 
17.17 At what age did you start giving ‘Name’ to drink something other than breast milk? Never = 99 
|__|__| 
Months 
|__|__| 
Months 
|__|__| 
Months 
|__|__| 
Months 
|__|__| 
Months 
|__|__| 
Months 
|__|__| 
Months 
|__|__| 
Months 
17.18 
 
 
Since this time yesterday till now, did ‘Name’ 
receive any of the following items? (Prompt each 
item)Medicine  = Vitamin/Medicine/ORS 
1 Medicine  
2 Solid food  
3 Liquid food  
4 Breast milk  
1 Medicine  
2 Solid food  
3 Liquid food  
4 Breast milk 
1 Medicine  
2 Solid food  
3 Liquid food  
4 Breast milk 
1 Medicine  
2 Solid food  
3 Liquid food  
4 Breast milk 
1 Medicine  
2 Solid food  
3 Liquid food  
4 Breast milk 
1 Medicine  
2 Solid food  
3 Liquid food  
4 Breast milk 
1 Medicine  
2 Solid food  
3 Liquid food  
4 Breast milk 
1 Medicine  
2 Solid food  
3 Liquid food  
4 Breast milk 
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SECTION 18: HIV / AIDS & Literacy test 
18.1 – Have you ever heard of HIV/AIDS? 
0. No (–► 18.3) o 
1. Yes o 
 
18.2 – Is there anything a person can do to avoid getting HIV/AIDS?  
0. No o 
1. Yes o 
 
18.3 What can a person do to prevent HIV/AIDS?  
(Do not read responses) 
1. Abstain from sex O 
2. Use a condom  O 
3. Limit to one partner, faithful to one partner  O 
4. Avoid sex with prostitutes  O 
5. Avoid sex with person with many partners  O 
6. Avoid sex with persons who inject drugs intravenously  O 
7. Avoid blood transfusions  O 
8. Avoid injections  O 
9. Avoid sharing razors, blades and needles O 
 
 
Can you (the women respondent) read a simple message and do a simple calculation? 
 18.4 Read 18.5  Calculation  
O O 
 
 
 
End of female questionnaire.  Please thank your respondents for their time, and say that this 
will be used for government planning, but may or may not result in programmes or projects 
for your community. 
 
  
 
